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ABSTRACT
Lightweight Silicon-based Security
Concept, Implementations, and Protocols
by
Mehrdad Majzoobi
Advancement in cryptography over the past few decades has enabled a spectrum
of security mechanisms and protocols for many applications. Despite the algorithmic
security of classic cryptography, there are limitations in application and implemen-
tation of standard security methods in ultra-low energy and resource constrained
systems. In addition, implementations of standard cryptographic methods can be
prone to physical attacks that involve hardware level invasive or non-invasive attacks.
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) provide a complimentary security paradigm
for a number of application spaces where classic cryptography has shown to be inef-
ficient or inadequate for the above reasons. PUFs rely on intrinsic device-dependent
physical variation at the microscopic scale. Physical variation results from imperfec-
tions and random fluctuations during the manufacturing process which impact each
device’s characteristics in a unique way. PUFs at the circuit level amplify and capture
variation in electrical characteristics to derive and establish a unique device-dependent
challenge-response mapping.
Prior to this work, PUF implementations were unsuitable for low power applica-
tions and vulnerable to wide range of security attacks. This doctoral thesis presents a
coherent framework to derive formal requirements to design architectures and proto-
cols for PUFs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive work that
introduces and integrates these pieces together. The contributions include an intro-
duction of structural requirements and metrics to classify and evaluate PUFs, design
of novel architectures to fulfill these requirements, implementation and evaluation of
the proposed architectures, and integration into real-world security protocols.
First, I formally define and derive a new set of fundamental requirements and
properties for PUFs. This work is the first attempt to provide structural require-
ments and guideline for design of PUF architectures. Moreover, a suite of statistical
properties of PUF responses and metrics are introduced to evaluate PUFs.
Second, using the proposed requirements, new and efficient PUF architectures are
designed and implemented on both analog and digital platforms. In this work, the
most power efficient and smallest PUF known to date is designed and implemented
on ASICs that exploits analog variation in sub-threshold leakage currents of MOS
devices. On the digital platform, the first successful implementation of Arbiter-PUF
on FPGA was accomplished in this work after years of unsuccessful attempts by the
research community. I introduced a programmable delay tuning mechanism with
pico-second resolution which serves as a key component in implementation of the
Arbiter-PUF on FPGA. Full performance analysis and comparison is carried out
through comprehensive device simulations as well as measurements performed on a
population of FPGA devices.
Finally, I present the design of low-overhead and secure protocols using PUFs for
integration in lightweight identification and authentication applications. The new pro-
tocols are designed with elegant simplicity to avoid the use of heavy hash operations
or any error correction. The first protocol uses a time bound on the authentication
process while second uses a pattern-matching index-based method to thwart reverse-
engineering and machine learning attacks. Using machine learning methods during
the commissioning phase, a compact representation of PUF is derived and stored in
a database for authentication.
“Dedicated to my parents”
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
While classic cryptography has tremendously advanced and matured over the past few
decades, there are still many application domains where the computational overhead
or the assumptions of the classic cryptography are limiting factors.
Classic cryptography often relies on algorithmically secure operations such as dis-
crete logarithm and factorization and a secret key to establish security. Once these
algorithms are implemented on actual physical hardware, a whole new array of vul-
nerabilities arise. Side channel attacks attempt to derive secret keys by non-invasively
and invasively monitoring the side channel information leaked from the target sys-
tem. Such attacks on the physical hardware may include monitoring and analyzing
side channel information in event timing, power consumption, electromagnetic ema-
nations, as well as fault injection attacks and direct probing. Moreover, permanent
storage of secret keys requires integration of non-volatile memory such as using ROM
or Flash technology. Invasive probing and scanning electron imaging can be per-
formed to read the internal memory values that store the secret key. In addition, the
computational complexity of classic cryptographic algorithms imposes a burden on
applications with ultra low power requirements and resource constrained systems.
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) provide a complimentary security paradigm
for a number of application spaces where classic cryptography has shown to be in-
efficient or inadequate. PUFs exploit the information inherently embedded in the
physical variation of the silicon devices to enable a unique chip-dependent mapping
2from a set of digital inputs (challenges) to digital outputs (responses). PUFs can be
employed to provide security at multiple levels and to address a range of problems
from securing processors [4], to IP protection [5], and IC authentication [6].
Prior to this work, PUF implementations suffered from inefficient designs that
made them unsuitable for low power applications and vulnerable to broad range of
security attacks. In addition, the exiting authentication protocols because of the
use hash operation and/or error correction are not suited for low power applications.
This doctoral thesis presents novel formal requirements, properties, and protocols for
PUFs that are used to design new architectures and implementations. The thesis
starts from the foundation to formally define and derive a set of requirements and
properties for physically unclonable functions. These definitions give us a tool to
test, analyze and evaluate PUFs. After consolidating the definition and properties,
I move from abstract concepts to concrete architectural requirements and guidelines
to construct secure and efficient PUFs.
Once the requirements and desired properties are determined, robust and effi-
cient PUFs architectures are introduced and implemented across various platforms
including digital and analog ICs that conform to the introduced requirements. In par-
ticular, two PUF structures are implemented on FPGAs that leverage delay variation
of digital components. The first method uses an at-speed characterization mecha-
nism to measure component delays. The second is the long-sought implementation of
arbiter-based PUF. Many efforts made by the research community to implement the
arbiter-based PUF on FPGA have been previously unsuccessful, mainly because of
the difficulty to achieve a symmetric routing of the arbiter PUF. The difficulty arises
from the lack of freedom in routing on FPGA dictated by the rigid fabric of FPGA
interconnects. In this thesis, I show the first implementation of arbiter-based PUF
3on FPGA realized through a novel delay tuning mechanism of pico-second resolution.
On ASIC, an ultra-low power analog PUF implementation is presented that ex-
ploits variations in sub-threshold leakage currents of MOS devices. This is the most
power efficient and smallest PUF implementation known to date. The circuit was
taped out in IBM 90nm low power technology. The results show that the leakage-
based PUF circuit consumes 40 femto joules to generate one bit of response. Full
performance analysis and comparison are carried out on these implementations. Sta-
tistical properties and performance metrics such as response error rate in presence
of temperature and voltage supply variations as well as speed, area, and power con-
sumption are measured and reported.
Finally, I present the design of low overhead and secure protocols using PUFs. The
goal of these protocols is to protect the PUF against machine learning attacks and
prevent eavesdroppers or dishonest provers to pass the authentication without having
access to the physical medium (PUF). Also, the protocols prevent an attacker dis-
guised as a verifier to extract information from the PUF. The protocols are designed
with elegant simplicity to dramatically lower overhead by refraining from computa-
tionally expensive classic cryptographic operations and error correction techniques.
Two specific protocols, one exploiting a time bound on the authentication process
and the other one utilizing a pattern matching index-based authentication on PUF
responses are introduced to integrate the PUF in lightweight applications. The pat-
tern matching protocol use a true random number generator (TRNG) to generate a
nonce (number-used-once) and a random secret index. A TRNG based on flip flop
metastability and a closed loop feedback system is further developed and implemented
on FPGA [7].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive work that intro-
4duces and integrates these pieces together. The contributions range from introduc-
tion of structural requirements and metrics to classify and evaluate PUFs, design of
novel architectures to fulfill these requirements, implementation and evaluation of the
proposed architectures on FPGAs and ASICs, and eventually integrating them into
real-world security protocols.
1.1 Focus
Research work for the thesis is divided into four sub-problems.
• First, A formal conceptual and structural definition as well as a set of expected
properties for PUFs are derived. Lack of consistent and structural approach
to PUF design as well as disparate attempts to define desired properties and
performance metrics of PUFs in the research community was the motivation
behind this phase of the research work. Part of this phase was accomplished
during my Master’s research work [8]. Statistical and performance metrics were
derived and tested on delay-based PUF in [2]. In [9], PUF implementation
challenges and obstacles on FPGAs were identified. Formal definitions on PUF
were developed later in [10], and [11].
• The second of part of the thesis involves implementation and evaluation of
the proposed concepts and architectures on FPGA. Two candidate structures
were implemented on FPGA. Prior to this research work, the only reported
PUF implementation was based on ring oscillators. Ring oscillators, in addition
to inefficiencies because of high power consumption and area overhead, do not
satisfy the Strong PUF requirements. The first proposed structure uses at-speed
test circuit and a clock sweep to measure the component delay and then maps
5the delays into digital responses [12, 13, 14]. The results obtained through
this research also motivated researchers in other fields to develop statistical
modeling and sparse sampling tools to enable fast delay characterization and
process variation modeling [15, 14].
The second implementation constructs and utilizes finely programmable delay
lines to implement the arbiter PUF on FPGA [16]. Prior to this work, there
have been many unsuccessful attempts to implement arbiter-based PUFs on
FPGA as also identified in early phases of the research [9]. Even researchers
had argued that implementation of arbiter-based PUF on FPGA is not viable
[17]. Experimental results in this work reported an average response error rate of
5% . Response error rate was significantly reduced by a challenge classification
method. The method only selects robust challenges that yield larger delay
differences with the knowledge of the component delays.
• Third, an analog implementation based on sensing variations in sub-threshold
leakage currents of MOS transistor arrays was presented in [10]. Since the main
application space for PUFs is ultra low power system, I proposed an analog
ASIC implementation of the PUF to further reduce the power consumption.
This work was the first attempt to build Strong PUFs on analog platforms
using sub-threshold leakage currents. The PUF generated digital responses by
sensing the differences between minuscule leakage currents from a an array of
MOS devices biased in the sub-threshold region. The leakage-based PUF is the
most power efficient and smallest known to date. The performance is evaluated
under various operating conditions (temperatures and voltage supplies) and
challenge configurations. The lowest response error rate of 3% was achieved
6when 8 currents were combined at the common gate voltage of 0.3V. The circuit
was taped out in IBM 90nm low power technology. The simulation results show
that the PUF circuit consumes 40 femto joules to generate one bit of response.
• Finally, two protocols are designed to enable integration of the PUF building
blocks into real world lightweight applications. The first protocol is particularly
designed for reconfigurable platforms such as FPGAs [12, 13]. The protocol en-
forces a time bound on the prover response time from the moment the device
is configured. It is assumed that the reconfigurable system component delays
are measured and stored through an initial registration phase. The time bound
makes it practically impossible to reverse engineering the FPGA bitstream to
discover the location and configuration of the PUF. Distance bounding protocols
introduced in early works [18, 19] protect systems such as smart card payments
and keyless entry against relaying attacks. These protocols are built upon the
same concept of timing the challenge/response process. The second protocol
is more generic and uses a pattern matching mechanism on the responses [20].
The pattern reveals almost no information about the original response sequence.
The concept of pattern matching for reliable key generation was proposed in
[21]. The index-based protocol avoids the use of computationally heavy stan-
dard cryptographic operations and error correcting codes, and thus creating an
elegantly simple yet powerful authentication protocol. The proposed protocol
in this thesis requires a TRNG module to generate a random index. I designed
and implemented a TRNG based on flip-flop metastability and a closed loop
feedback system in [7] to generate the required true random bits. The TRNG
uses the programmable delay lines introduced in [16] to force the flip-flops into
a metastable state. A closed-loop feedback system monitors the random output
7bits and automatically adjusts the delays to correct for any statistical deviations
from metastable operating point. This was the first innovative approach to use
metastability of digital circuits to generate true random numbers in hardware.
1.2 Thesis Organization
The next chapter provides a preliminary background of the physical unclonable func-
tion (PUF) concept and present implementations. In the background chapter, the
structural requirements of Strong PUF as well as the desired properties are further
discussed. Following Chapter 2, the related literature is reviewed in Chapter 3. In
particular, Chapter 3 discusses the shortcomings and merits of previous PUF imple-
mentations and protocols, as well as their vulnerabilities to attacks. Related work
on implementations of true random number generation in hardware is reviewed later
at the end of Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents a delay characterization method on
FPGA and demonstrates the use of the developed mechanism to implement a delay-
measuring PUF. The second half of Chapter 4 harnesses the insight from observations
made earlier in the chapter to build a precise delay tuning mechanism with pico-second
resolution. The approach uses the programmable delay tuning system to implement
arbiter-based PUF on FPGA. Comprehensive measurements and evaluations are per-
formed on Virtex 5 FPGA on both approaches. Chapter 5 dives into the analog
implementation of Strong PUF on ASICs. In this chapter, an ultra-low power PUF is
introduced and implemented on 90 nano-meter IBM low power technology. Chapter
6 presents two new low power authentication protocols using PUFs. Appendix A
presents the first true random number generation in hardware that uses metastability
of flip-flops. Appendix B contains a set of plots which shows the measurement data
taken from the twelve FPGAs in detail. Chapter 7 concludes this work.
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Background
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) use the inherent and embedded nano- and
micro-scale randomness in silicon device physics to establish and define a secret which
is physically tied to the hardware. The randomness is introduced by the imperfections
and lack of precise control during the fabrication process that lead to variations in
device physical dimensions, doping, and material quality. The variation in device
physics transfers itself into variations in electrical properties, such as transistor drive
current, threshold voltages, capacitance and inductance parasitics. Such variations
are unique for each IC and device on each IC. Rather than generating a static ID,
PUFs typically accepts a set of input challenges and map them to a set of output
responses. The mapping is a function of the unique device-dependent characteristics.
Therefore, the responses two PUFs on two different chips produce to the same set of
inputs are different.
A common way to build a PUF in both ASICs and FPGAs is by measuring,
comparing, and quantifying the propagation delays across the logic elements and
interconnects. The variations in delays appears in forms of clock skews on clock
network, jitter noise on the clock, variations in setup and hold times of flipflops, and
the propagation path delays through the combinational logic. On analog platforms,
there is larger degree of freedom to measure variations on voltages and currents while
doing the same is not feasible on digital platforms where everything is in the binary
form of zeros and ones.
9PUFs can be classified based on their abstract architecture which explains how
challenges map to responses. In this thesis, an architectural paradigm is introduced
which delineates the mapping process. The implications of such architecture is further
discussed below. The architectural paradigm is used as a cornerstone to classify the
PUF as what is commonly referred in the literature as Strong PUF.
Figure shows the high-level architectural block diagram that defines the construc-
tion of Strong PUF. The diagram consists of three stages. The green blocks on
the lowest end generator process sensitive electric signals such as voltages, currents,
and/or delays. These blocks can be as simple as a single transistor device. The
yellow block above the generator block performs the selection function. The select
block based on the input challenge selects a subset of the generated signals. A critical
property of the select block for a Strong PUF is the ability to select an exponential
number of subsets ( 2n) from the set of generated signals of size n, where the maxi-
mum number of subsets is n!. The combine block above the select block, receives the
selected subsets and combines the values in the subsets. The combination function
can be a linear addition or some non-linear function. A critical observation that must
be made here is that the combination must be performed in analog domain to preserve
the information content of the generated signals. Since digital combination requires
quantization of the signals, the entropy and information content of the combined
values will be severely reduced if combination is performed in digital domain. For
instance, think of adding a large number of real values and then quantizing the result,
versus quantizing the real values first and perfoming the addition in digital domain.
It is clear that the quantization error dramatically decreases the information content
of the real number when second approach is taken. In reality, the entropy of the
former approach is limited by the analog noise during the analog addition operation.
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After combination is performed, the combined values are compared by the compare
block and the result is represented in binary format.
compare
combine
select
PSG PSG PSG...
...challenge
challenge
PSG: process-sensitive signal generator
tune
response
Figure 2.1 : The conceptual architecture of Strong PUF.
The work in [1] was the first to exploit the unique and unclonable delay variations
of silicon devices for PUF formation. The PUF, known as arbiter PUF or delay-
based PUF, is shown in Figure 2.2. The PUF uses the analog differences between
the delays of two parallel paths that are identical in design and prior to fabrication,
but the physical device imperfections make the delays different. The arbiter PUF
follows the architectural paradigm depicted in Figure . Beginning the operations,
a rising transition is exert at the PUF input producing a racing condition on the
parallel paths. An arbiter at the end of the paths generates binary responses based
on the signal arrival times. To enable multiple path combinations and generate an
exponential number of challenge/response pairs, the paths are divided into multiple
sub-paths interleaved by a set of path swapping switches. The challenges to the PUF
11
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Path-swapping 
switch
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(D-flipflop)
C1=0/1 C2=0/1 Cn=0/1
Figure 2.2 : Arbiter-based PUF introduced in [1].
control the switches and, therefore, the varying paths are formed. Let us compare
the mechanics of challenge-to-response mapping of the arbiter PUF with the diagram
shown in Figure . In the arbiter PUF, the process sensitive signals are in form of
delays. The selection operation is enabled by the set of path swapping switches along
the signal propagation path. The combination is carried out inherently as the delays
along the path add up. Therefore, the combination is simply a linear addition of
the delays of the selected paths. Note that the challenges can select an exponential
number of propagation paths and delays. A flip-flop at the end of the PUF compares
the delay of the two paths and produces a binary result. As it can be observed, all of
the components of architectural paradigm depicted in Figure can be detected in the
PUF structure.
A successful implementation of this type of PUF was demonstrated on ASICs
platforms [22]. It is critical to note that the differences in delays should be solely
coming from manufacturing variation and not from design-induced biases. To obtain
exact symmetry on the signal paths and to equalize the nominal delays, careful and
precise custom layout with manual placement and routing is required for implemen-
tation on ASICs. The lack of a fine control over arbitrary placement and routing on
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FPGA has resulted in difficulty in balancing the nominal delays on the racing paths
within the arbiter-based PUF. Implementation on FPGA was troubled because of
the constraints in routing and placement imposed by the rigid fabric of the FPGA as
studied in [17, 9].
In this thesis, the problem is addressed by demonstrating a working implemen-
tation of the arbiter-based PUF on FPGA that utilizes a non-swapping symmetric
switch structure as well as a precise programmable delay line (PDL) component to
cancel out the systematic delay biases. The path-swapping switch previously used in
the arbiter-based PUF of Figure 2.2 can be implemented by two multiplexers (MUX)
and one inverter as depicted in Figure 4.14 (b). However, due to cross wiring from the
lower half to the upper half (diagonal routing), maintaining symmetry in path lengths
for this type of switches is extremely difficult. To avoid diagonal routing, a non-path
swapping switch with a similar structure is introduced in Chapter 4 which uses two
MUXes as shown in Figure 4.14 (a). As it can be seen on the figure, after applying
the method the resulting routing and path lengths are symmetric and identical across
the symmetry axis (drawn by the dashed line).
Another family of PUFs amenable to implementation on digital platforms and in
particular FPGAs, is based on ring oscillators (RO-PUF). A ring oscillator is com-
posed of an odd number of inverters forming a chain. Due to variations in delays
of comprising logic components and interconnects, each ring oscillates at a slightly
different frequency. The RO-PUF measures and compares the unique frequency of
oscillation within a set of ring oscillators. A typical structure of RO-PUF is shown
in Figure 2 (a). Most of the work around RO-PUFs is focused on post process-
ing techniques, selection, quantization and comparison mechanisms to extract digital
responses while achieving robustness of responses and high response entropy. It is
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Figure 2.3 : Two implementation of path selecting switches.
important to note that due to the absence of combine block in RO-PUFs and sub-
exponential challenge space, RO-PUF does not pass the requirements to be classified
as Strong PUF.
One of the early papers to consider and study ring oscillators for digital secret
generation is [6]. The work proposes a 1-out-of-k mask selection scheme to enhance
the reliability of generated response bits. For each k ring oscillator pairs, the pair
that has the maximum frequency distance is chosen. It is argued that if the frequency
difference between two ring oscillators is big enough, then it is less likely that their
difference changes sign in presence of fluctuations in operating temperature or supply
voltage.
In order to achieve higher stability and robustness of responses, extra information
can be collected by measuring the oscillation frequency under different operating
conditions. Methods presented in references [23, 24] use this information to efficiently
pair or group the ring oscillators to obtain maximum response entropy. Specifically,
frequency measurement is performed at two extreme (low and high) temperatures
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and a linear model is built to predict the frequency at middle temperature points.
Systematic process variation can adversely affect the ability of RO-PUF for gen-
eration of unique responses. A method to improve uniqueness of ring oscillator PUF
responses is discussed in [25]. A compensation method is used to mitigate the effect
of systematic variation by (i) placing the group of ROs as close as possible (ii) pick-
ing the physically adjacent pair of ROs while evaluating a response bit. Large scale
characterization of an array of ROs on 125 FPGAs (Spartan3E) is performed in [26]
The existing inherent race conditions in combinatorial logics with feedback loop
are also used in development of other types of PUFs. For instance, a loop made
of two inverter gates can have two possible states. At the power-up, the system
enters into a metastable state that settles onto one of two possible states. In fact,
the faster gate will dominate the slower gate and determine the output. The idea
of back-to-back inverter loops is used in SRAM memory cells. SRAM-based PUFs
based on the inherent race condition and variations in component delays produce
unique outputs at startup. Unfortunately, in SRAM-based FPGAs, an automatic
internal reset mechanism prevents using the unique startup value. A more practical
implementation that is based on the same concept but uses the logic components on
FPGA rather than the configuration SRAM cells, is referred to as a butterfly PUF.
The basic structure of a butterfly PUF is shown in Figure 2 (b). Butterfly PUF is
made of two D-flipflops with asynchronous preset and reset inputs. The flip-flops are
treated as combinational logics. The work in [17] presents a comparative analysis
of delay based PUF implementations on FPGA. The work particularly focuses on
the requirements of maintaining symmetry in routing inside the building blocks of
Arbiter-based PUF, Butterfly PUF, and RO-PUF.
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Figure 2.4 : Other delay based PUFs
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Chapter 3
Related Literature
The idea of using complex unclonable features of a physical system as an underly-
ing security mechanism was initially proposed by Pappu et al. [27]. The concept
was demonstrated by studying mesoscopic physics of coherent transport through a
disordered medium. Another group of researchers observed that the manufacturing
process variability in modern silicon technology can be utilized for building a PUF.
They proposed the arbiter-based PUF architecture based on the variations in CMOS
logic delays [1].
In the arbiter-based PUF, the analog delay difference between two structurally
identical parallel paths is compared. Due to manufacturing variations, the delay of
these two paths are slightly different. The architecture of the arbiter-based PUF with
two racing parallel paths is demonstrated in Figure 3.1. A step input simultaneously
triggers the two paths. At the end of the two parallel paths, an arbiter is used to
convert the analog delay difference between the paths to a digital value. The arbiter
can be implemented by a D-flip flip in practice. The two paths can be divided into
several smaller subpaths by inserting path swapping switches. Each set of inputs to
the switches act as a challenge set (denoted by Ci), defining a new pair of racing
paths whose delays can be compared by the arbiter to generate a one-bit response.
The arbiter-based PUF implementation on ASICs was demonstrated, and a num-
ber of attacks and countermeasures were discussed [1, 28, 22, 6, 29].
For implementing PUFs on FPGA, Ring oscillator (RO) PUFs were proposed [6].
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Figure 3.1 : Delay-based PUF.
Ring oscillator (RO) PUFs rely on the specific and unique delay of an oscillating path
on each device [6]. The presently known PUFs of this type contain a set of ROs and a
pairing mechanism to compare the their frequencies. The major drawback of the RO
PUFs is having only a quadratic number of challenges with respect to the number of
RO’s [30] thus does not satisfy the Strong PUF requirement. Furthermore, the ROs
(while in use) consume significant dynamic power due to frequent transitions during
oscillations.
Another class of candidate FPGA PUFs are SRAM-PUFs and butterfly PUFs
[5, 31, 29]. Each FPGA SRAM cell would naturally tend to one logic state (either
zero or one) upon startup. The impact of mismatch and manufacture variability on
the SRAM power-on states is utilized to extract secret digital bits. However, similar
to RO-PUFs, there are only a polynomial number of challenges with respect to the
number of SRAM cells. Due to the lack of analog combining mechanism and the
sub-exponential size of the challenge space, SRAM PUF do not also adhere to our
definition of Strong PUF. A similar work in [32] implements the same concept with
nonstandard custom SRAM cells.
A digital ID extraction system based on device mismatch using an auto-zeroing
comparator was introduced in [33]. The major difference between static ID generation
using physical device variations and PUFs is the lack of challenges in the former to
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select and combine the analog variations before quantization/digitization.
Besides the ongoing research on PUFs, several other relevant works on delay char-
acterization serve as the enabling thrust for realization of our novel PUF structures.
To perform delay characterization, Wong et al. in [34] proposed a built-in self-test
mechanism for fast chip level delay characterization. The system utilizes the on-chip
PLL and DCM modules for clock generation at discrete frequencies. The delay fin-
gerprint can be used to detect any malicious modification to the original design due
to insertion of hardware Trojan horses [35, 36].
In addition, the use of reconfigurability to enhance system security and IP pro-
tection has previously been a subject of research. The work in [37] proposes a secure
reconfiguration controller (SeReCon) which provides secure runtime management of
designs downloaded to the DPR FPGA system and protects the design IP. The work
in [38] introduces methods for securing the integrity of FPGA configuration while
[39] leverages the capabilities of reconfigurable hardware to provide efficient and flex-
ible architectural support for security standards as well as defenses against hardware
attacks.
3.1 Vulnerability analysis and countermeasures
PUFs have been subject to modeling attacks that breach their security and break
any protocols built upon them. The basis for contemporary PUF modeling attacks
is collecting a set of CRPs by an adversary, and then building a numerical or an
algorithmic model from the collected data. For the attack to be successful, the models
should be able to correctly predict the PUF response to any new challenge with a
high probability.
In particular, it was observed that the linear arbiter-based PUF is vulnerable
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to modeling attacks and the use of nonlinear feed-forward arbiters, and hashing to
proposed to safeguard against this attack [1]. Moreover, error correcting codes were
proposed in [40] to alleviate instability of PUF responses.
Further efforts were made to address the PUF vulnerability issues by adding in-
put/output networks, adding nonlinearities to hinder machine learning and enforcing
an upper bound on the PUF evaluation time [9, 30, 41].
Recent work on PUF modeling (reverse-engineering) used various machine learning
techniques to attack both implementation and simulations of a number of different
PUF families, including the realizations and simulations of linear arbiter PUFs and
feed-forward arbiter PUFs [40, 42, 43, 2, 44].
The use of XORs for mixing the responses from the arbiter PUFs to safeguard
them against attacks was pursued in [6]. More comprehensive analysis and description
of PUF security requirements to ensure their protection against modeling attacks were
presented in [45, 9]. The latest reported attacks on PUFs with k levels of XORs at
their output were able to model up to k = 5 (after a year of running their algorithms
on supercomputers) [44]. This was assuming that the full string of CRPs was known
to the attacker. At the time of this publication, to the best of our knowledge, no
stronger attacks on k-level XOR arbiter PUFs have been reported. We also note that,
the results for k = 5 in [44] are for “synthetic” PUFs, not for a silicon realization of
a PUF.
The use of PUF responses to create secret key for cryptographic algorithms has
been explored in previous work, including [1, 40, 46, 47, 48]. Since cryptographic keys
need to be stable, error correction is used for stabilizing inherently noisy PUF response
bits. The classic method for stabilizing noisy PUF bits (and noisy biometrics) is error
correction which is done by using helper bits or syndrome [49].
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Since error correction needs to be robust, secure, and efficient, it is important to
consider limiting the amount of secret bit leakage through the disclosed syndrome
bits. A generic secure key extraction framework based on biometric data and error
correction was devised in [49]. A newer information-theoretically secure Index-Based
Syndrome (IBS) error correction coding for PUFs was introduced and realized in
[48]. All the aforementioned methods incur a rather high overhead of error correction
logic, e.g., BCH, which prohibits their usage in lightweight systems. An alternative
efficient error correction method by pattern matching of responses was very recently
proposed [21]. We use this pattern matching idea in our work. In [21], a 4-XOR
arbiter has been used which for real PUFs has not yet been broken. Their archi-
tecture also works with a higher than 4 XOR mixing. However the error correction
performance would be reduced. Their proposed protocol and application area was
limited to secret key generation.
In the context of challenge-response based authentication for Strong PUFs, send-
ing the syndrome bits for correcting the errors before hashing was investigated [1];
the necessity for error correction was due to hashing the responses before sending
them to avoid reverse engineering. Naturally, the inputs to the hash have to be sta-
ble to have a predictable response. The proposed error correction methods in this
context are classic error correction and fuzzy extraction techniques. Aside from sen-
sitivity to PUF noise (because it satisfies the strict avalanche criterion) hashing has
the drawback of high overhead in terms of area, delay, and power.
3.2 Hardware True Random Number Generation
The work in [50] uses sampling of phase jitter in oscillator rings to generate a sequence
of random bits. The output of a group of identical ring oscillators are fed to a parity
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generator function (i.e., a multi-input XOR). The output is constantly sampled by
a D-flipflop driven using the system clock. In absence of noise and identical phases,
the XOR output would be constant (and deterministic). However, in presence of a
phase jitter, glitches with varying non-deterministic lengths appear at the output.
An implementation of this method on Xilinx Virtex II FPGAs was demonstrated in
[51].
...
...
...
... ... ... ...
D
Flipflop
Q
C
Clock
Figure 3.2 : TRNG based on sampling the ring oscillator phase jitter.
Another type of TRNG is introduced in [52] that exploits the arbiter-based Phys-
ical Unclonable Function (PUF) structure. PUF provides a mapping from a set of
input challenges to a set of output responses based on unique chip-dependent man-
ufacturing process variability. The arbiter-based PUF structure introduced in [1],
compares the analog delay difference between two parallel timing paths. The paths
are built identically, but the physical device imperfections make their timing differ-
ent. A working implementation of the arbiter-based PUF was demonstrated on both
ASICs [22] and FPGA [16, 6]. Unlike PUFs where reliable response generation is
desired, the PUF-based TRNG goal is to generate unstable responses by driving the
arbiter into the metastable state. This is essentially accomplished through violating
the arbiter setup/hold time requirements. The PUF-based TRNG in [52] searches for
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challenges that result in small delay differences at the arbiter input which then cause
unreliable response bits.
To improve the quality of the output TRNG bitsteam and increase its randomness,
various post-processing techniques are often performed. The work in [50] introduces
resilient functions to filter out deterministic bits. The resilient function is imple-
mented by a linear transformation through a generator matrix commonly used in
linear codes. The hardware implementation of resilient function is demonstrated in
[51] on Xilinx Virtex II FPGAs. The TRNG after post processing achieves a through-
put of 2Mbps using 110 ring oscillators with 3 inverters in each. A post-processing
may be as simple as von Neumann corrector [53] or may be more complicated such
as an extractor function [54] or even a one-way hash function such as SHA-1 [55].
Besides improving the statistical properties of the output bit sequence and remov-
ing biases in probabilities, post-processing techniques increase the TRNG resilience
against adversarial manipulation and variations in environmental conditions. An
active adversary may attempt to bias the output bit probabilities to reduce their
entropy. Post-processing techniques typically govern a trade-off between the quality
(randomness) of the generated bit versus the throughput. Other online monitoring
techniques may be used to assure a higher quality for the generated random bits. For
instance, in [52], the generated bit probabilities are constantly monitored; as soon as
a bias in the bit sequence is observed, the search for a new challenge vector producing
unreliable response bits is initiated. A comprehensive review of hardware TRNGs can
be found in [56]. The TRNG system proposed in this work simultaneously provides
randomness, robustness, low area overhead, and high throughput.
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Chapter 4
PUFs based on timing variations
4.1 Delay Signature Extraction
To measure the delays of components inside FPGA, we exploit the device reconfig-
urability to implement a delay signature extraction circuit. A high level view of the
delay extraction circuitry is shown in Figure 4.1. The target circuit/path delay to
be extracted is called the Circuit Under Test (CUT). Three flip-flops (FFs) are used
in this delay extraction circuit: launch FF, sample FF, and Capture FF. The clock
signal is routed to all three FFs as shown on the Figure. Assume for now that the
binary challenge input to the CUT is held constant and thus the CUT delay is fixed.
Assuming the FFs in Figure 4.1 are initialized to zero, a low-to-high signal is sent
through the CUT by the launch FF at the rising edge of the clock. The output is
sampled T seconds later on falling edge of the clock (T is half the clock period).
Notice that the sampling register is clocked at the falling edge of the clock. If the
signal arrives at the sample FF before sampling takes place, the correct signal value
would be sampled; otherwise, the sampled value would be different and will generate
an error. The actual signal value and the sampled value are compared by XOR logic
and the result is held for one clock cycle by the capture FF.
A more careful timing analysis of the circuit reveals the relationship between the
delay of the CUT (tCUT ), the clock pulse width (T ), the clock-to-Q delay at the launch
FF (tclk2Q), and the clock skew between the launch and sample FFs (tskew). The
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Figure 4.1 : The timing signature extraction circuit.
setup/hold of the sampling register and the setup/hold time of the capture register
are denoted by tsetS, tholdS, tsetC , and tholdC respectively. The propagation delay of the
XOR gate is denoted by tXOR. The time it takes for the signal to propagate through
CUT and reach the sample flip flop from the moment the launch flip flop is clocked
is represented by tP . Based on the circuit in Figure 4.1, tP = tCUT + tclk2Q − tskew.
As T approaches tP , the sample flip flop enters a metastable operation (because
of the setup and hold time violations) and its output becomes non-deterministic.
The probability that the metastable state resolves to a 0 or 1 is a function of how
close T is to tP . For instance, if T and tCUT are equal, the signal and the clock
simultaneously arrive at the sample flip flop and the metastable state resolves to a
1 with a probability of 0.5. If there are no timing errors in the circuit, the following
relationships must hold:
tholdC < tP < T − tsetS (4.1)
The errors start to appear if tp enters the following interval:
T − tsetS < tP < T + tholdS (4.2)
The rate (probability) of observing timing error increases as tp gets closer to the upper
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limit of Inequality 4.2. If the following condition holds, then timing error happens
every clock cycle:
T + tholdS < tP < 2T − (tsetC + tXOR) (4.3)
Observability of timing errors follows a periodic behavior. In other words, if tp
goes beyond 2T − (tsetC + tXOR) in Inequality 4.3, the rate of timing errors begins
to decrease again. This time the decrease in the error rate is not due to the proper
operation but it is because the timing errors cannot be observed and captured by the
capture FF.
Inequality 4.4 corresponds to the transition from the case where timing error
happens every clock cycle (Inequality 4.3) to the case where no errors can be detected
(Inequality 4.5).
2T − (tsetC + tXOR) < tP < 2T + (tholdC − tXOR) (4.4)
2T + (tholdC − tXOR) < tP < 3T − tsetS (4.5)
Timing errors no longer stay undetected if tp is greater than 3T − tsetS . Timing errors
begin to appear and can be captured if tp falls into the following intervals:
3T − tsetupS < tp < 3T + tholdS (4.6)
If the following condition holds, then timing error gets detected every clock cycle.
3T + tholdS < tp < 4T − (tsetC + tXOR) (4.7)
This periodic behavior continues the same way for integer multiples of T , however it
is upper bounded by the maximum clock frequency of the FPGA device. In general,
if T is much larger than the XOR and flip flop delays, the intervals can be simplified
to n× T < tp < (n+ 1)× T and timing errors can only be detected for odd values of
n.
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Notice that in the circuit in Figure 4.1, high-to-low and low-to-high transitions
travel through the CUT every other clock cycle. The propagation delay of these
two transitions differ in practice. Suppose that the low-to-high transition propaga-
tion delay (tl→hp ) is smaller than the high-to-low transition propagation delay (t
h→l
p ).
Then, for low-to-high transitions, tl→hp satisfies Inequalities 4.1 and for high-to-low
transitions, th→lp satisfies Inequality 4.3. Timing errors in this case happen only for
high-to-low transitions and as a result timing error can only be observed 50% of the
times. Thus, the final measurement represents the superposition of both effects.
The top plot in Figure 4.2 shows the observed/measured probability of timing error
as a function of clock pulse width (T ). The right most region (R1) corresponds to the
error free region of operation expressed by Inequality 4.1. Note that the difference
between th→lp and t
l→h
p causes the plateau at R2. The gray regions marked by R2
and R4 correspond to the condition expressed by Inequality 4.2. Region R5 can be
explained by Inequality 4.3. Metastable regions of R6 and R8 relate to inequality
4.4. Inequality 4.5 corresponds to the error free region of R9. Similar to R3, regions
R7 and R11 are due to the difference between high-to-low and low-to-high transition
delays. Metastable regions of R10 and R12 relate to inequality 4.6 and lastly region
R13 corresponds Inequality 4.7.
Notice that similar to tp, all of the delays defined above for the XOR, flip flops,
and clock skew have two distinct values for high-to-low (rising edge) and low-to-high
(falling edge) transitions. Nevertheless, all of the inequalities defined in this section
hold true for both cases.
We refer to the characterization circuit that includes the CUT as a characterization
cell or simply a cell. Each cell in our implementation is contained in one configurable
logic block (CLB). The circuit under test consists of four cascaded look-up tables
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Figure 4.2 : The probability of observing timing failure as a function of clock pulse
width, T .
(LUT) each implementing a variable delay inverter. We explain in Section 4.2 how
the delay of the inverters can be changed.
4.1.1 Signature extraction system
In this subsection, we describe the system that efficiently extracts the probability of
observing timing failure as a function of clock pulse width for a group of components
on FPGA. The circuit shown in Figure 4.1 only produces a single bit flag of whether
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errors happen or not. We require a mechanism to measure the rate or probability at
which errors appear at the output of the circuit in Figure 4.1 to extract the smooth
transitions as depicted in Figure 4.2.
To measure the probability of observing error at a given clock frequency, an error
histogram accumulator is implemented by using two counters. The first counter is
the error counter whose value increments by unity every time an error takes place.
The second counter counts the clock cycles and resets (clears) the error counter every
2N clock cycles, where N is the size of the binary counters. The value of the error
counter is stored in the memory exactly one clock cycle before it is cleared. Now, the
stored number of errors normalized to N would yield the error probability value.
Figure 4.3 : The architecture for chip level delay extraction of logic components.
The clock frequency to the system is swept linearly and continuously in Tsweep
seconds from fi =
1
2Ti
to ft =
1
2Tt
, where Tt < tp < Ti. A separate counter counts
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the number of clock pulses in each frequency sweep. This counter acts as an accurate
timer that bookmarks the frequency at which timing errors happen. The value of
this counter is retrieved every time the error counter content is written into memory.
This action happens every 2N clock cycles. For further details on clock synthesis see
[14].
The system shown in Figure 4.3 is used for extracting the delays of an array of
CUTs on the FPGA. Each square in the array represents the characterization circuit
(or cell) shown in Figure 4.1. Any logic configuration can be utilized within the
CUT in the characterization circuit. In particular, the logic inside the CUT can be
made a function of binary challenges, such that its delay varies by the given inputs.
The system in Figure 4.3 characterizes each cell by sweeping the clock frequency
once. Then, it increments the cell address and moves to the next cell. The cells are
characterized in serial. The row and column decoders activate the given cell while the
rest of the cells are deactivated. Therefore, the output of the deactivated cells remain
zero and the output of the OR function solely reflect the timing errors captured in
the activated cell. Each time the data is written to the memory, three values are
stored: the cell address, the accumulated error value, and the clock pulse number at
which the error has occurred. The clock counter is then for each new sweep. The
whole operation iterates over different binary challenges to the cells. Note that the
scanning can also be performed in parallel to reduce the characterization time [14].
4.1.2 Characterization accuracy
The timing resolution, i.e., the accuracy of the measured delays, is a function of
the following factors: (i) the clock jitter and noise, (ii) the number of frequency
sample points, and (iii) the number of pulse samples at each frequency. Recall that
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the output of the characterization circuit is a binary zero/one value. By resending
multiple clock pulses of the same width to the circuit and summing up the number
of ones at the output, a real-valued output can be obtained. The obtained value
represents the rate (or the probability when normalized) at which the timing errors
happen for the input clock pulse width. Equivalently, it represents a sample point on
the curve shown in Figure 3. The more we repeat the input clock pulse, the higher
sample resolution/accuracy can be achieved along Y axis. Now suppose that the clock
pulse of width T is sent to the PUF forM times. Due to clock jitter and phase noise,
the characterization circuit receives a clock pulse of width Teff = T + Tj , where Tj
is additive jitter noise. Let us assume Tj is a random variable with zero mean and
a symmetric distribution. Since the output probability is a smooth and continuous
function of Teff , estimating the probability by averaging will be an asymptotically
unbiased estimator as M →∞. Finally, the minimum measurable delay is a function
of the maximum speed at which the FFs can be driven (maximum clock frequency).
When performing a linear frequency sweep, a longer sweep increases (ii) and (iii) and
thus the accuracy of the characterization. A complete discussion on characterization
time and accuracy for this method is presented in [14].
4.1.3 Parameter extraction
So far, we have described the system that measures the probability of observing
timing errors for different clock pulse widths. The error probability can be represented
compactly by a set of few parameters. These parameters are directly related to the
circuit component delays and flip flop setup and hold time. It can be shown that the
probability of timing error can be expressed as the sum of shifted Gaussian CDFs [9].
The Gaussian nature of the error probabilities can be explained by the central limit
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Figure 4.4 : Two random placement of PUF cells on FPGA.
theorem. Equation 4.8 shows the parameterized error probability function.
fD,Σ(t) = 1 + 0.5
|Σ|−1∑
i=1
−1#i/2$
[
Q(
t− di
σi
)
]
(4.8)
where Q(x)= 1√
2pi
∫∞
x exp
(
−u22
)
and di+1 > di. To estimate the timing parameters, f
is fit to the set of measured data points (ti,ei), where ei is the error value recorded
when the pulse width equals ti.
4.2 Timing PUF
To enable authentication, a mechanism for applying challenge inputs to the device
and observing the evoked responses is required. In this section, we present a PUF
circuit based on the delay characterization circuit shown in Figure 4.1. The response
is a function of the clock pulse width T , the delay of circuit under test, tCUT , and flip
flop characteristics, σi. In the following, we discuss three different ways to challenge
the PUF.
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4.2.1 Pulse challenge
One way to challenge the PUF is to change the clock pulse width. The clock pulse
width can be considered as an analog input challenge to the circuit in Figure 4.1. The
response to a given clock pulse of width T is either 0 or 1 with the probability given
by Equation 4.8 or the plot in Figure 4.2.
However, the use of clock pulse width as challenge has a number of implications.
First, the response from the PUF will be predictable if T is either too high and too low
compared to the nominal circuit under test delay tCUT . Predictability of responses
makes it easy for the attacker to impersonate the PUF without knowledge of the
exact value of tCUT . As another example, suppose that the response to multiple clock
pulses of the same width, T1, are equal to ‘0’; then, the attacker can deduce that
T1 is in either region R1 or R9 in Figure 4.2 with high confidence. If the nominal
boundaries of these regions (R1,...,R13) are known, the attacker can determine which
region T1 belongs by just comparing it to the boundaries TRi < T1 < TRi+1 . Knowing
the correct region, it becomes much easier to predict the response to the given pulse
width, especially for odd regions R1, R3, ..., R13.
Within the thirteen regions shown in Figure 4.2, the six regions that include
transitions produce the least predictable responses. Setting the challenge clock pulse
width to the statistical median of the center points of transitions in Figure 4.2 would
maximize the entropy of the PUF output responses. In other words, there are only
six independent pulse widths that can be used for challenges and the results for
other pulse widths are highly predictable. As it can be seen, the space of possible
independent challenges for this type of challenge is relatively small.
Another limitation of pulse challenges is that depending on the available clocking
resources, generating many clock pulses with specific widths can be costly. Under
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such limitations, the verifier may prefer to stick to a fixed pulse width. In the next
sections, we look into other alternatives to challenge the PUF.
4.2.2 Binary challenge
An alternative method to challenge the PUF is to change the tCUT while the clock
pulse width is fixed. So far, we assumed that the delay of CUT is not changing. To
change tCUT , one must devise an input vector to the circuit-under-test that changes
its effective input/output delay by altering the signal propagation path inside the
CUT. In other words, the binary input challenge vector alters the CUT delay by
changing its internal signal propagation path length, hence affecting the response.
Figure 4.5 : The internal structure of LUTs. The signal propagation path inside the
LUTs change as the inputs change.
In this work, we introduce a low overhead method to alter the CUT delay by
tweaking the LUT internal signal proportion path. We implement the CUT by a
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set of LUTs each implementing an inverter function. Figure 4.5 shows the internal
circuit structure of an example 3-input LUT. In general, a Q-input LUT consists of
2Q-1 2-input MUXs which allow selection of 2Q values stored in SRAM cells. The
SRAM cell values are configured to implement a pre-specified functionality.
In this example, the SRAM cell values are configured to implement an inverter.
The LUT output is only the function of A1, i.e., O = f(A1), disregarding values
on A2 and A3. However, changing the inputs A2 and A3 can alter the delay of the
inverter due to the modifications in the signal propagation paths inside the LUT. For
instance, two internal propagation path for the values of A2A3 = 00 and A2A3 = 11
are highlighted in Figure 4.5. As it can be seen, the path length for the latter case is
longer than the former, yielding a larger effective delay. The LUTs in Xilinx Virtex 5
FPGAs consist of 6 inputs. Five inputs of the LUT can be used to control and alter
the inverter delay resulting in 25 = 32 distinct delays for each LUTs. Finally, note
that the delays for each binary input must be measured prior to authentication. The
response to the PUF is then predicted by the verifier based on the configured delay
and the input clock pulse width.
4.2.3 Placement challenge
Another important type of challenge which can be implemented solely on reconfig-
urable platforms is the placement challenge. This type of challenge is enabled by the
degree of freedom in placing the PUF cells on FPGA in each configuration. During
characterization, a complete database of all CUT delays across the FPGA is gath-
ered. At the time of authentication, only a subset of these possible locations within
the FPGA array are selected to implement and hold the PUF cells. The placement
challenge is equivalent to choosing and querying a subset of PUF cells, where the
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selection input is embedded in the configuration bitstream.
Figure 4.4 shows two random placements of 20 PUF cells across the FPGA array.
Each black square in the figure contains a PUF cell which receives a pulse and binary
challenge. The high degree of freedom in placement of PUF cells across the FPGA
results in a huge challenge/response space. In our implementation, each PUF cell
can be fit into a CLB on FPGA. With N CLBs on FPGA, there will be
(
N
k
)
different
ways to place k PUF cells on FPGA. The smallest Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA (LX30) has
2400 CLBs which enables
(
2400
512
)
number of possibilities to place 512 PUF cells on the
FPGA.
4.3 Response robustness
Although PUF responses are functions of chip-dependent process variations and input
challenges, they can also be affected by variations in operational conditions such
as temperature and supply voltage. In this section, we discuss two techniques to
provide calibration and compensation to make responses resilient against variations
in operational conditions.
The first method takes advantage of on-chip sensors to perform linear calibration
of the input clock pulse width challenge, while the second method uses a differential
structure to cancel out the fluctuations in operational conditions and extract signa-
tures that are less sensitive to variations in operational conditions. We will discuss
the advantages and disadvantages of each method. The existing body of research
typically addresses this issue mainly through the use of error correction techniques
[40] and fuzzy extractors [46]. The error correction techniques used for this purpose
rely on a syndrome which is a public piece of information being sent to the PUF
system along with the challenge. The response from the PUF and the syndrome are
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input to the ECC to produce the correct output response. The methods discussed in
this section help reduce the amount of errors in responses and they can be used along
with many other error correction techniques.
4.3.1 Linear Calibration
The extracted delay signatures at characterization phase are subject to changes due to
aging of silicon devices, variations in the operating temperature, and supply voltage
of the FPGA. Such variations can undermine the reliability of the authentication
process. The proposed method performs calibration on clock pulse width according
to the current operating conditions. Fortunately, many modern FPGAs are equipped
with built-in temperature and core voltage sensors. Before authentication begins, the
prover is required to send to the verifier the readings from the temperature and core
voltage sensors. The prover, then based on the current operating conditions, adjusts
and calibrates the clock frequency. The presented calibration method linearly adjusts
the pulse width using the Equations 4.9 and 4.10.
Tcalib = αtmp × (tmpcur − tmpref) + Tref (4.9)
Tcalib = αvdd × (vddcur − vddref) + Tref (4.10)
tmpref and vddref are the reference temperature and FPGA core voltage measured
during the characterization phase. tmpcur and vddcur represent the current operating
conditions. The responses from the PUF to the clock pulse width Tcalib are then
treated as if Tref were sent to the PUF at reference operating condition. The calibra-
tion coefficients αtmp and αvdd are device specific. These coefficients can be determined
by testing and characterizing each single FPGA at different temperatures and supply
voltages. For example, if dtmp1i and d
tmp2
i are i-th extracted delay parameter under
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operating temperatures tmp1 and tmp2, then
αtmp,i =
dtmp1i − dtmp2i
tmp1 − tmp2 ,αvdd,i =
dvdd1i − dvdd2i
vdd1 − vdd2 (4.11)
Note that for each delay parameter on each chip, two calibration coefficients can be
defined (one for temperature and one for voltage supply effect) and the clock pulse
width can be calibrated accordingly. Ideally, with the help of a more sophisticated
prediction model (potentially a nonlinear model) trained on a larger number of tem-
perature and voltage supply points (instead of two points as in Equation 4.11), highly
accurate calibration can be performed on the clock frequency. In reality, due to lim-
itations on test time and resources, it is impractical to perform such tests for each
FPGA device. Instead, calibration coefficients can be derived from a group of sample
devices and a universal coefficient can be defined for all devices by averaging the
coefficients. In Section A.2, we demonstrate reliability of authentication for universal
calibration coefficients. Note that in Equations 4.9 and 4.10, we assume that only one
type of operational condition variation is happening at a time and both temperature
and voltage supply do not fluctuate simultaneously. However, if we consider these
effects independently, we can superimpose the effects by applying Equation 4.9 to
the output of Equation 4.10. A more general approach would be to consider a 2D
nonlinear transformation given by:
Tcalib = f (vddcur, tmpcur, Tref) (4.12)
The main disadvantage of calibration methods is the time and effort required to
characterize the delay at various operational conditions. Hence, more effort spent
on building and training the regression model, the more accurate calibration and a
higher robustness in responses can be achieved.
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4.3.2 Differential Structure
In this section, we introduce a differential PUF structure, that compensates for the
common mode variation induced by the impact of fluctuations in operational condi-
tions on the delays. The goal of the method is to extract a signature that is invariant
to fluctuations in operational conditions.
Figure 4.6 : The differential signature extraction system.
The PUF introduced previously receives a clock pulse and a binary challenge to
produce a binary response. Here, instead of looking at the output responses from a
single PUF cell, we consider the difference of the responses from two adjacent PUF
cells. More specifically, the outputs of the capture flip flops from the two cells drive
an XOR logic. Assuming i1 and i2 are the inputs and O is the output of the XOR
logic, then the probability of output being equal to ‘1’ , ρO, as a function of the
probability of inputs being equal to ‘1’, ρ1 and ρ2, can be written as:
ρO = ρ1 + ρ1 − 2× ρ1 × ρ2 (4.13)
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ρ1 and ρ2 are functions of the clock pulse width (T) and the binary challenge as
explained in Section 4.1. The resulting output probability is shown in Figure 4.7 (see
the red dashed line) for two sample PUF cells under (a) normal operating condition
and (b) low operating temperature of -10oC. As it can be seen, since both PUF
cell delay parameters are shifted together under the same operational conditions, the
resulting XOR output probability retains the shape, with only a scalar shift along the
x axis. To extract robust signatures, one needs to look into shift invariant features
that are less sensitive to environmental variables. Features such as the high/low
region widths of the resulting XOR probability plot, or the total area under the XOR
output probability plot can be used for this purpose.
Figure 4.7 : The timing error probability for two sample PUF cells and the resulting
XOR output probability under (a) normal operating condition and (b) low operating
temperature of -10oC.
In this work, we use the area under the XOR output probability curve. The area
is shaded in Figure 4.7 for the two operating conditions. The area under the curve
can be calculated by integrating the probability curve from the lowest to highest
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clock pulse width. We use the Riemann sum method to approximate the total area
underneath the XOR probability curve in hardware. The result of the integration is
a resilient real valued signature extracted from the PUF cell pairs.
In order to find a quick approximation to this integral in hardware, we sweep
the input clock frequency linearly from frequency fl = 1/2Tu to fu = 1/2Tl where
Tl % Dmin, Tu & Dmax, Dmin and Dmax represent lowest and highest bounds on
delay parameters under all operational conditions. In other words, the sweep window
must always completely contain all parts of the curve. The output of the XOR is
connected to a counter as shown in Figure 4.6. The aggregate counter value after
a complete sweep is a function of the area under the curve. Please note that this
value is not exactly equal to the area under the curve and is only proportional to the
integral. Also, a longer sweep time results in a larger number of clock pulses and thus
more accurate approximation of the signature. This is analogous to using a larger
number of narrower subintervals when approximating the area under curve with the
Riemann sum to achieve a smaller approximation error.
Although the generated responses are less sensitive to variations in operational
conditions, it should be noted that the responses are a function of the difference in
the timing characteristics of the two PUF cells. The area under the curve loses a
lot of information about the shape of the curve and also some information is lost
on each individual probability curve through the difference operation. Therefore,
the responses have a lower entropy compared to the linear calibration method. To
obtain the same amount of information, more PUF cell pairs must be challenged and
scanned. Another limitation of this structure is the length of the input challenge. To
estimate the area under the curve with a high accuracy, the whole interval from the
lowest to the highest frequency must be swept in fine steps and thus, it would require
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more clock pulses compared to the other method. Using few clock pulses leads to
a larger area estimation error, lower probability of detection, and higher probability
of false alarm. Finally, the pairing of the PUF cells introduces another degree of
freedom to the system where a set of challenges can specify pairing of the PUF cells.
4.4 Experimental evaluations
In this section, the implementation details of the signature extraction system are
presented. We demonstrate results obtained by measurements performed on Xilinx
FPGAs and further use the platform to carry out authentication on the available
population of FPGAs. For delay signature extraction, the system shown in Figure
4.3 is implemented on Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGAs. The system contains a 32× 32 array
of characterization circuits as demonstrated in Figure 4.1. The CUT inside the char-
acterization circuit consists of 4 inverters each being implemented using one 6-input
LUT. The first LUT input (A1) is used as the input of the inverter and the rest of the
LUT inputs (A2,...,A6) serve as the binary challenges which alter the effective delay
of the inverter. The characterization circuit is pushed into 2 slices (one CLB) on the
FPGA. In fact, this is the lower bound on the characterization circuit hardware area.
The reason is that the interconnects inside the FPGA force all the flip flops within
the same slice to operate either on rising edge or falling edge of the clock. Since the
launch and sample flip-flops must operate on different clock edges, they cannot be
placed inside the same slice. In total, 8 LUTs and 4 flip flops are used (within two
slices) to implement the characterization circuit. The error counter size (N) is set
to 8. To save storage space, the accumulated error values are stored only if they are
between 7 and 248.
We use an ordinary desktop function generator to sweep the clock frequency from
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8MHz to 20MHz and afterwards shift the frequency up 34 times using the PLLs
inside the FPGA. The sweeping time is set to 1 milli seconds (due to the limitations
of the function generator, a lower sweeping time could not be reached). The measured
accumulated error values are stored on an external memory and the data is transferred
to a PC for further processing. Notice that the storage operation can easily be
performed without the logic analyzer by using any off-chip memory.
The system is implemented on twelve Xilinx Virtex 5 XC5VLX110 chips and the
measurements are taken under different input challenges and operating conditions.
The characterization system in total uses 2048 slices for the characterization circuit
array and 100 slices for the control circuit out of 17,280 slices.
The measured samples for each cell are processed and the twelve parameters as
defined in Section 4.1.3 are extracted. Figure 4.8 shows the measured probability of
timing error versus the clock pulse width for a single cell and a fixed challenge. The
(red) circles represent original measured sample points and the (green) dots show
the reconstructed samples. As explained earlier, to reduce the stored data size, error
samples with values of 0 and 1 (after normalization) are not written to the memory
and later are reconstructed from the rest of the sample points. The solid line shows
the Gaussian fit on the data as expressed in Equation 4.8.
Parameter extraction procedure is repeated for all cells and challenges. Figure 4.9
shows the extracted parameters d1 and σ1 for all cells on chips #9 and #10 while the
binary challenge is fixed. The pixels in the images correspond to the cells within the
32×32 array on FPGA. Some levels of spatial correlation among d1 parameters can
be observed on the FPGA fabric.
The boxplots in Figure 5.10(a) show the distribution of the delay parameters di
for i=1,2,...,6 over all 12 chips and 1024 cells and 2 challenges. The central mark on
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Figure 4.8 : The probability of detecting timing errors versus the input clock pulse
width T . The solid line shows the Gaussian fit to the measurement data.
the boxplot denotes the median, the edges of the boxes correspond to the 25th and
75th percentiles, the whiskers extent to the most extreme data points and the plus
signs show the outlier points.
Using the measured data from the twelve chips, we investigate different authen-
tication scenarios. The authentication parameters substantially increase the degree
of freedom in challenging the PUF. These parameters include the number of clock
pulses to send to the PUF (Np), the number of binary challenges to apply to the PUF
(Nc), the challenge clock pulse width (T ), and the number of PUF cells (Ncell) to be
queried. In other words, in each round of authentication, Nc challenges are applied to
Ncell PUF cells on the chip and then Np pulses of width T are sent to to these PUF
cells. The response to each challenge consists of Np bits. For ease of demonstration,
the response can be regarded as the percentage of ones in the Np response bits, i.e.,
an integer between 0 and Np.
To quantify the authentication performance, we study the effect of Ncell and T
on the probability of detection (pd) and false alarm (pf). Detection error occurs in
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Figure 4.9 : The extracted delay parameters d1 (a,b) and σ1 (c,d) for chips 9 and 10.
cases where the test and target chips are the same, but due to instability and noise
in responses, they fail to be authenticated as the same. On the other hand, false
alarm corresponds to the cases where the test and target chips are different, but
they are identified as the same chips. During this experiment, the binary challenges
to PUF cells are fixed and the number clock pulses is set to Np = 8. The clock
width (T ) is set to each of the medians of the values shown in Figure 5.10 (a).
Setting the clock pulse width to the median values results in least predictability of
responses. All Ncell=1024 PUF cells are queried. The same experiment is repeated
for 10 times to obtain 10 response vectors (each vector is Np = 8 bits) for each chip.
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Therefore, each clock pulse generates 8×1024 bits of responses from every chip. After
that, the distance between the responses from the same chips (intra-chip distance)
over repeated evaluations is measured using the normalized L1 distance metric. The
distance between responses from different chips (inter-chip distance) is also measured.
If the distance between the test chip and the target chip responses is smaller than a
pre-specified detection threshold, then the chip is successfully authenticated. In the
experiments, the detection threshold is set at 0.15.
Table 4.1 shows the probability of detection and false alarm for different clock pulse
widths and number of queried PUF cells. To calculate the probabilities, the distance
between the response of every distinct pair of FPGAs are calculated. The number
of pairs with a response distance of less than 0.15, normalized to the total number
of pairs yield the probability of false alarm. To find the probability of detection,
the distance between the responses from the same chip acquired at different times are
compared to 0.15. The percentage stay within the threshold determine the probability
of detection. As it can be observed, the information extracted from even the smallest
set of cells is sufficient to reliably authenticate the FPGA chip if the pulse width is
correctly set.
(a)
Ncell
Challenge Pulse Width
1.23 1.15 1.06 1.03 0.9 0.87
64 0.96 0 0 0 0 1.52
128 2.04 0 0 0 0 1.52
256 4.55 0 0 0 0 1.52
(b)
Ncell
Challenge Pulse Width
1.23 1.15 1.06 1.03 0.9 0.87
64 93.3 96.2 100 100 100 100
128 94.2 98.8 100 100 100 100
256 99.85 100 100 100 100 100
Table 4.1 : (a) probability of false alarm (b) probability of detection.
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In the next experiment, we study the effect of fluctuations in the operating con-
ditions (temperature and core supply voltage) on the probabilities of detection and
false alarm. Moreover, we demonstrate how linear calibration of the challenge clock
pulse width can improve the reliability of detection. To calculate the calibration co-
efficient defined by Equation 4.11, we repeat the delay extraction process and find
the delay parameters for all twelve chips at temperature -10oC and core voltage 0.9
Volts. The chip operates at the temperature 37oC and core voltage of 1 volts in the
normal (reference) condition. We use the built-in sensors and the Xilinx Chip Scope
Pro package to monitor the operating temperature and core voltage. To cool down
the FPGAs, liquid compressed air is consistently sprayed over the FPGA surface.
Figure 5.10 (b) depicts the changes in the distribution of the first delay parameter
(d1) at the three different operating conditions.
The probabilities of detection and false alarm are derived before and after per-
forming calibration on the challenge pulse width for different clock pulse widths and
number of binary challenges to the cells. In this experiment, all 1024 PUF cells
on the FPGA are queried for the response. Np =8 as before. As it can be seen
in Table 4.2, the detection probabilities are significantly improved after performing
linear calibration based on the coefficients extracted for each chip. The variables
vlow and tlow correspond to -10oC temperature and 0.9 supply voltages respectively.
The reported probabilities of Table 4.2 are all in percentage. Also note that for the
challenge pulse width of T = 0.87 ns, the probability of detection reaches 100% and
probability of alarm falls to zero after calibration. The same holds true for Nc = 2
and T = 0.87, 0.9, 0.95. Thus, increased level of reliability can be achieved during
authentication with proper choice of pulse width and number of challenges.
Figure 4.11 shows how performing calibration decreases the intra-chip response
47
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
 Extracted Parameters
 D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
(n
an
o 
se
cs
)
(a)
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
low Vdd normal low Temp
 D
is
tri
bu
tio
n 
(n
an
o 
se
cs
)
 Temp=−10oC
  VDD = 1 V
 Temp=37oC
  VDD = 1 V
 Temp=37oC
  VDD = 0.9 V
(b)
Figure 4.10 : (a) Distribution of delay parameters di. (b) The distribution of d1 for
normal, low operating temperature, and low core voltage.
distances in presence of temperature changes. The histogram corresponds to T =
0.95ns and Nc = 2 in Table 4.2 before and after calibration.
Next, we examine the differential signature extraction system presented in Section
4.3.2. To extract the signature, the base frequency is swept from 8 to 20 MHz in a
linear fashion in 1 mili second and shifted up 34 times using the FPGA internal
PLLs. The sweep is repeated for the 512 pairs of PUF cells producing a real-valued
signature vector of size 512. A large number of pulses (∼ 107) are generated in a
complete sweep. The signature as explained in Section 4.3.2 is the accumulation
of the timing errors over a complete sweep. To achieve an accurate approximation
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Figure 4.11 : The inter-chip and intra-chip response distances for T = 0.95 ns and
Nc = 2 before (top) and after (bottom) calibration against changes in temperature.
of the area under the curve, a large number of clock pulses must be tried. This is
the main disadvantage of this method compared to the singled ended method. To
extract the shift invariant parameters such the region width and/or area under the
probability curve probing the PUF circuit at single frequency points will not yield
sufficient information. Therefore, a complete sweep covering the regions with high
information content is needed. The L1 distance of the signatures from the same
chip under different operational conditions (intra-chip distance) and the distance of
the signatures from different chips (inter-chip distance) are calculated. Figure 4.12
shows the distribution of intra and inter-chip distance of signatures under variations
in temperature and supply voltage for the twelve Virtex 5 chips. As it is shown in
the figure, the distance among signatures obtained at room temperature and −10oC
temperature from the same chip is always smaller than those from different chips,
resulting in 100% probability of detection and 0% false alarm probability. However,
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No Calibration Calibrated
NC=1 NC=2 NC=1 NC=2
vlow tlow vlow tlow vlow tlow vlow tlow
pd pf pd pf pd pf pd pf pd pf pd pf pd pf pd pf
T
1.23 18.4 0 33.3 16.7 18.4 0 33.3 22.29 100 0 75 0 100 0 75 0
1.06 18.4 0 18.4 0 18.4 0 18.4 0 50 0 50 0 57.3 0 50 0
1.01 18.4 0 16.7 0 18.4 0 16.7 0 66.6 0 75 0 68.2 0 75 0
0.95 18.4 0 16.7 0 18.4 0 16.7 0 66.7 0 100 0 84.9 0 100 0
0.9 16.7 0 25 0 16.7 0 25 0 83.3 0 91.7 0 83.4 0 100 0
0.87 25 0 25 0 25 1.5 25 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0
Table 4.2 : The probability of detection and false alarm before and after performing
calibration on the challenge pulse width in presence of variations in temperature and
core voltage.
with 10% variations in voltage supply, the intra- and inter-chip distributions overlap
slightly.
4.5 Arbiter PUF on FPGA
One of the major problems in implementation of PUFs on FPGAs, particulary the
arbiter-based PUFs, is in signal routing. Unlike ASICs where hand-drawn custom lay-
out is possible, routing on FPGA is constrained by its rigid fabric and interconnect
structure. As a result, performing completely symmetric routing is physically infea-
sible in most cases. The PUF designer may do his/her best to constrain and guide
the placement and routing software to achieve the highest degree of symmetry in the
PUF layout. However, due to physical constraints of the FPGA fabric, the designer
may still not be able to achieve complete symmetry on some routes. Asymmetries
in routing when implementing PUFs can lead to bias in delay differences leading to
predictable responses, lack of randomness, and decreased response entropy [17, 9].
The PUF routing can be divided into four different sections; the routing (1) before
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Figure 4.13 : Arbiter-based PUF with path swapping switches.
the first switch, (2) inside the switches, (3) between switches, and (4) after the last
switch or before the arbiter (see Figure 4.13). As we will show later, by placing
the logic components on symmetric sites and locations on the FPGA, the routing
between switches will automatically follow a symmetric route. However, maintaining
a complete symmetry between the top and bottom path routes before the first switch
and after the last switch is structurally infeasible. To alleviate this problem, we
introduce and exploit accurate PDLs to tune and remove the bias delay differences
caused by asymmetries in net routing. We further introduce a new switch structure
that has a symmetric implementation by construction.
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4.5.1 Tuning with Programmable Delay Lines
In this section, we introduce a low overhead and high precision PDL with pico-second
resolution. The introduced PDL is implemented by a single LUT. Figure 4.5 shows
the internal structure of an example 3-input LUT. An n-input LUT can be configured
to implement any n-input logic function. The LUT in Figure 4.5 is configured so that
the inputs A2 and A3 act as don’t-care bits. The LUT output is inverted A1 and
is not a function of A2 and A3. However, looking more closely, the inputs A2 and
A3 determine the signal propagation path inside LUT. For instance, if A2A3 = 00,
the signal propagates through the solid path (red), whereas if A2A3 = 11, the signal
propagates through the path marked with the dashed-lines (blue). The lower dashed
path is slightly longer than the upper solid path which results in a larger propagation
delay.
The Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA has 6-input LUTs which can implement a PDL with
5 control bits - there are 4 LUTs in each Slice and two Slices per each CLB. Similar
to the above example, the first LUT input, A1, is the inverter input and the rest of
the LUT inputs control the delay of the inverter. For, A2A3A4A5A6=A[2:6]=00000,
the inverter has the smallest delay (shortest internal propagation path) and for
A2A3A4A5A6=A[2:6]=11111, the inverter has the maximum delay. In general if A[2:6] >
A′[2:6] then DLUT (A) > DLUT (A
′), where DLUT (A) and DLUT (A′) are the delay of the
inverter with A and A′ as the control inputs respectively.
We measured the changes in LUTs’ propagation delays under different inputs.
For delay measurements, we used the timing characterization circuit shown in Figure
4.1. The characterization circuit consists of a launch flip-flop, sample flip-flop, and
capture flip-flop, an XOR gate, and the Circuit Under Test (CUT) whose delay is to
be measured.
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At the rising edge of the clock a signal is sent through the CUT by the launch
flip-flop. At the falling edge of the clock, the output of the CUT is sampled by the
sample flip-flop. If the signal arrives at the sample flip-flop well before sampling
takes place, the correct value is sampled. The XOR compares the sampled value with
steady state output of the CUT and produces a zero if they are the same. Otherwise,
the XOR output rises to ‘1’, indicating a timing violation. If the signal arrival and
the sampling time (almost) simultaneously occur, the sample flip-flop would enter
into a metastable condition and produce a non-deterministic output. By sweeping
the clock frequency and monitoring the rate at which timing errors happen, the
CUT delay can be measured with a very high accuracy. For further details on the
delay characterization method the reader is referred to [13, 14]. The measurements
performed on Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGAs suggest that the maximum delay difference (i.e.,
A=00000, and A′=11111) achieved by each inverter is 9ps on average.
4.5.2 PDL-based Symmetric Switch
The first arbiter-based PUF introduced in [1] (see Figure 4.13) uses path swapping
switches as shown in Figure 4.14 (a). The switch, based on its selector bit, provides a
straight or cross connection. Figure 4.14 (b) shows the equivalent circuit implemen-
tation and delays. The path swapping switch structure does not lend itself to FPGA
implementation, since it is extremely difficult to equalize the nominal delays of the
top and bottom paths due to routing constraints, i.e., a and d (or the diagonal paths
b and c). To alleviate the issue, we propose a new non-swapping switch structure
as shown in Figure 4.14 (c). The yellow triangles in the figure represent two PDLs.
Figure 4.14 (d) shows its equivalent circuit where the nominal delay values of a and
d (or the diagonal paths b and c) must be the same.
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Figure 4.14 : (a),(b) path swapping switch and its delay abstraction (c),(d) PDL-
based switch and its delay abstraction.
The complete PUF circuit that uses the new switch structure and the tuning
blocks is shown in Figure 4.15. The presented system consists of N switches and K
tuning blocks. The tuning blocks insert extra delays into either the top or bottom
path based on their selector inputs to cancel out the delay bias caused by routing
asymmetry. The only difference between a tuning block and a switch block is that in
the former, the selectors to the top and bottom PDLs are controlled independently
but in the latter, the same selector bit drives both PDLs. Also note that the tuning
blocks do not necessarily have to be placed at the end of the PUF. As a matter of
fact, they can be placed anywhere on the PUF in between the switches.
Similar to the arbiter-based PUF with path swapping switches, the new PUF
structure is a linear system. The PUF response will be ‘1’ if the sum of the delay
switch differences along the path is greater than zero, and ’0’ otherwise:
N∑
i=1
Ci × (ai − di) + (1− Ci)× (bi − ci) +∆
R=0
≶
R=1
0, (4.14)
where ai, bi, ci, di are the i-th switch delays as shown in Figure 4.14 (d), Ci ∈ {0, 1}
is the i-th challenge bit, and R is the response. Also, ∆ is a constant delay difference
from first and last path segments and tuning blocks lumped together. The security
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aspects of the linear PUF structures against machine learning attacks can be boosted
by insertion of feed forward arbiter and attaching input/output XOR logic networks
to multiple rows of PUFs [2, 57]. The work in analyzing the complexity of machine
learning and model attacks against different classes of PUFs [58].
Figure 4.15 : The new arbiter-based PUF structure.
4.6 Precision Arbiter
Arbiters in practice are implemented by D flip-flops. As a result, an arbiter has a
limited resolution meaning that if the absolute delay difference of the arriving signals
is smaller than its setup and/or hold time, it enters a metastable state where its output
becomes highly sensitive to circuit noise and will be unreliable. The probability of
flip-flop output being equal to ‘1’ is a monotonically decreasing function of the input
signal timing difference (∆T ). Such probability in fact follows a Gaussian CDF curve
as shown in [9, 14]:
PO=1(∆T ) = Q(
∆T
σ
) (4.15)
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x exp
(
−u22
)
is the Q function. For an infinitely precise
arbiter, σ is infinitesimal i.e. σ → 1/∞, and PO=1(∆T )→ 1−U(∆T ) where U is the
step function.
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Figure 4.16 : Reducing the response instability due to arbiter metastability by using
majority voting.
To increase the arbiter accuracy, we propose multiple evaluations of the same
challenge to the PUF and running a majority vote on the output responses as shown
in Figure 4.26. The repetitive challenge evaluation combined with majority voting
is equivalent to having an arbiter with effectively smaller σ. We will quantify the
reduction in σ as a function of the number of repetitions in the experimental results
section.
4.7 Robust responses
Fluctuations in operational conditions such as temperature and supply voltage can
cause variations in device delays. The impact on delays may not be equal on all
devices. As an example, the signal propagation delay on the PUF top and bottom
paths is represented in Figure 4.17 by solid and dashed lines respectively. In this
example, the path delays increase with temperature at different rates. In the diagram
in Figure 4.17 (a), the delay difference ∆d at the end of the PUF for a given applied
challenge at nominal temperature is small, whereas ∆d in Figure 4.17 (b) is larger
for another challenge. The response to the challenge in Figure 4.17 (a) changes as
temperature varies because the delays change their order (cross). However, in Figure
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4.17 (b) the PUF response remains the same. As demonstrated by this example,
the responses to those challenges that cause large delay differences are unlikely to be
affected by temperature or supply voltage variations [6].
Figure 4.17 : Signal propagation delay as a function of temperature.
In this work, we estimate the delay difference at the input of the arbiter. To
estimate the cumulative delay difference (∆d), we ought to first train the delay pa-
rameters of the linear model of the PUF expressed in Equation 4.14 on the available
set of challenge and responses. After estimating the delay parameters, the left hand
sum in Equation 4.14 is evaluated for every new challenge. The distribution of the
resulting sum (∆d) to the set of available challenge-response pairs is next calculated.
Now based on the distribution, if the delay difference caused by a given challenge
falls in the tails of the distribution, we expect ( and will later verify and quantify it
through experiments) that the response to this challenge is less likely to be affected
by variations in operating conditions. Figure 4.18 shows the distribution of the delay
differences at arbiter input to a diverse set of challenges. The challenge set is parti-
tioned into equal sized partitions (bin) based on the delay difference each challenge
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Figure 4.18 : The distribution of ∆d and stability of responses in the corresponding
partitions.
produces. Next, the stability of response to the challenges in each set is measured.
We argue that the responses to challenges that fall into the center partitions exhibit
lower robustness compared to those in corner partitions.
4.8 Robustness versus Entropy
The next question that arises from classifying robust challenges from non-robust ones
is: ”Are robust challenges that good?”. In other words, are we trading off anything to
gain stability and robustness? From information theoretical point of view, it is likely
that the responses from more robust challenges bear lower entropy. For example,
consider the extreme case where responses are absolutely biased towards either zero
or one. In this case we have ultimate robustness whereas the entropy is zero and the
responses are not distinct enough for identification. This trade-off (if exists) can only
be quantified through measurements. We show this is in fact the case and quantify
the loss in entropy in return for robustness in the experimental results section.
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4.9 Experimental Evaluation
4.9.1 Programmable delay line
Before moving onto the PUF system performance evaluation, we shall first discuss
the results of our investigation on the maximum achievable resolution of the pro-
grammable delay lines. We set up a highly accurate delay measurement system similar
to the delay characterization systems presented in [13, 12, 14].
The circuit under test consists of four PDLs each implemented by a single 6-input
LUT. The delay measurement circuit as shown in Figure A.6 consists of three flip-
flops: launch, sample, and capture flip-flops. At each rising edge of the clock, the
launch flip-flop successively sends a low-to-high and high-to-low signal through the
PDLs. At the falling edge of the clock, the output from the last PDL is sampled by
the sample flip-flop. At the last PDL’s output, the sampled signal is compared with
the steady state signal. If the signal has already arrived at the sample flip-flop when
the sampling takes place, then these two values will be the same; Otherwise they
take on different values. In case of inconsistency in sampled and actual values, XOR
output becomes high, which indicates a timing error. The capture flip-flop holds the
XOR output for one clock cycle.
To measure the absolute delays, the clock frequency is swept from a low frequency
to a high target frequency and the rate at which timing errors occur are monitored and
recorded. Timing errors start to emerge when the clock half period (T/2) approaches
the delay of the circuit under test. Around this point, the timing error rate begins
to increase from 0% and reaches 100%. The center of this transition curve marks the
point where the clock half period (T/2) is equal to the effective delay of the circuit
under test.
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Figure 4.19 : The delay measurement circuit. The circuit under test consists of four
LUTs each implementing a PDL.
To measure the delay difference incurred by the LUT-based PDL, the measurement
is performed twice using different (complementary) inputs. In the first round of
measurement, the inputs to the four PDLs are fixed to A2−6 = 11111. In the second
measurement the inputs to the last PDL are changed to A2−6 = 00000. In our setup,
a 32×32 array of the circuit shown on Figure A.6 is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex 5
LX110 FPGA, and the delay from our setup is measured under the two input settings.
The clock frequency is swept linearly from 8MHz to 20MHz using a desktop function
generator and this frequency is shifted up by 34 times inside the FPGA using the
built-in PLL.
The results of the measurement are shown on Figure 4.20. Each pixel in the
image corresponds to one measured delay value across the array. The scale next to
the color-map is in nano-seconds. Figure 4.20 (a) and (b) show the path delay when
the last LUT in Figure is driven by A2−6 = 00000 and A2−6 = 11111 respectively.
Figure 4.20 (c) depicts the difference between the measured delays in (a) and (b). As
can be seen, the delay values in (b) are on average about 10 pico-seconds larger than
the corresponding pixel values in (a).
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4.9.2 Arbiter-based PUF evaluation
Next, we use the programmable delay lines to implement the arbiter-based PUF on
FPGA. The implemented PUF has 16 rows whose challenge input bits are connected
together and placed in parallel on the FPGA to produce 16 bits of responses per
challenge. Each PUF consists of 64 stages of PDLs, where the PDL is implemented
by 2 LUTs each acting as an inverter. Figure 4.21 shows the placement and routing
of one of the PUF rows. As it can be seen, except for the routing at the beginning
and end of the PUF, the rest follows a completely symmetric pattern.
4.9.3 Measurement setup
We have a population of 12 Xilinx Virtex 5 (LX110) FPGAs at our disposal. The
FPGAs are mounted on a ball-grid array socket available on Xilinx FF676 Proto-
type board only. Since the prototype board is stripped of any communication in-
terface, we create a synchronous serial communication protocol to send/receive the
data to/from XUP-V5 development board. From the XUP-V5 board, the data is
sent to the PC through the Ethernet communication interface at very high speed by
using SIRC API. SIRC (Simple Interface for Reconfigurable Computing) is an open
sourced software/hardware API developed at Microsoft Research that enables data
transfer at full Ethernet speed of 1GB/s between the FPGA and PC [59]. Addi-
tionally, to perform measurements under various temperature points, we use PTC10
temperature controller from Stanford Research Systems. The temperature controller
drives a TEC (Thermo-electric coupler) Peltier device. TEC is attached on the top
the FPGA and beneath a heat-sink. A closed-loop feedback system is established to
control the FPGA temperature accurately. The temperature feedback is provided by
an on-die diode junction voltage on the Virtex 5 device. This way the stable tem-
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perature would be that of the die temperature rather than the package temperature.
The temperature controller is further calibrated to reliably map the junction voltage
of the diode to die temperature using the temperature readings obtained through
ChipScope Pro on-die temperature sensor. The measurement system connections
and setup is depicted in Figure 4.22. Figure 4.23 shows the measurement system
setup in the lab. The raw data and scripts and software is made available online at
http://aceslab.org/node/1012.
4.9.4 Tuning the PUF
Before using the PUF, in order to see any changes in the responses, it must be tuned
to remove the delay bias resulting from routing asymmetry. In the first experiment,
we look at all 16 responses to find out at what tuning level their responses to a set of
random challenges are %50 zeros and %50 ones. To be able to find the best tuning
level, we feed the PUF with a set of 64,000 random challenges while for each challenge,
we sweep the tuning level from -10 to 40. In each sweep point (each tuning level),
we collect 64,000 responses from each PUF row (64,000×16 total for each FPGA).
Then, we look at the percentage of ones and zeros in each response set across different
tuning levels and find the set that is properly balanced.
We refer to tuning level as the difference in the number of ‘1’s in the top and
bottom PDL selector bits. The tuning level can be either positive or negative indi-
cating insertion of delays to the top and bottom path respectively. Note that when
the tuning level is set for example to 40, then it means that 40 of the PDL blocks out
of 64 blocks are dedicated to tuning and only 24 bits of the inputs serve as the input
challenge.
The response to a given challenge at each tuning level is repeated 128 times, and
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a majority vote on the responses is performed to resolve the repeated readings to a
single response value. Figure 4.24 shows the ratios of ones in each response set (y-
axis) as a function of tuning level (x-axis) for FPGA number 6. Since each PUF on
each FPGA produces 16 response bits, there are 16 lines on each subplot. There are
9 subplots in each plot. Each subplot corresponds to the measurement taken under
a different operating condition. The center subplot refers to the normal operating
condition (i.e. supply voltage VDD= 1 V and room temperature of 30oC). Note that
plot is only for one FPGA (FPGA number 6). We have repeated the same experiment
on all 12 FPGAs in the lab and the results are available online at [[XXXX.com]].
Figure 4.25 shows the distribution of center of the transition points across all
PUFs on all FPGAs.
4.9.5 Majority Voting
As discussed in the work, repeating the challenges to the PUF and running majority
voting on the obtained responses can help improve the precision of the arbiter. In
this section, we quantify this effect. Figure 4.26 shows the probability of observing
a ‘1’ output from a flip-flop as a function of the input signals delay difference. This
characteristic has been measured on Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGAs [9, 14]. The width of the
transition region ( 3σ) gets narrower as evaluation is repeated and more statistics is
gathered.
The equivalent σ which represents the width of the metastable window (i.e., 3σ) is
calculated for different number of repetitions as shown Figure 4.27. The reduction in
the metastable window width is logarithmic with respect to the number of repetitions.
For 10 repetitions, σ = 2.5 ps.
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4.9.6 Robust response classification
Next, we measure the effect of robust challenge classification on PUF error rate in
presence of temperature and supply voltage variations as discussed in Section 4.3.
Each challenge to the arbiter PUF creates a delay difference (∆) at the input of the
arbiter (flip-flop). The ∆s produced by all challenges in the challenge space form a
Gaussian distribution. If half of the responses are one and half are zero, then this
distribution has a mean of zero. The distribution is split by the arbiter decision edge.
Those challenges that create a ∆ that is larger that e, result in a ’1’ response and a
zero response otherwise, where e is basically the arbiter bias remained after tuning.
We partition the ∆ distribution and the corresponding challenge space into 20 sets
of equal size. The ∆s close to the decision border and their corresponding responses
are more sensitive to environmental condition fluctuations, and those farther apart
from the decision border (i.e. |∆ - e| & 0) are less affected by such variations. The
Figure 4.28 shows the robustness of the responses to different subset of challenges.
The x-axis in each subplot refers to the challenge partition (bin) number. Each
partition contains 64000/20 = 3200 challenges. The y-axis shows the stability of the
corresponding responses, where ’1’ means no errors in the responses and ’0’ means
completely erroneous responses. The error is measured by comparing the responses
from eight corner cases to the response at the normal operating condition (room
temperature and nominal supply voltage). Therefore, each subplot contains eight
lines for each corner case. As it can be observed the challenges in bins that are
closer to the decision border produce responses with larger error rates. There are 16
subplots in each figure where each correspond to a PUF output response bit.
Figure 4.29 shows the distribution of the error rates for each challenge partition
using boxplots. Each subplot corresponds to an operating condition corner. As it
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can be seen, the average error rates is considerably lower at corner (lower and higher)
partitions.
4.9.7 Robustness versus entropy
Now that we have quantified the stability of responses to different challenges, it is
time to investigate the entropy of the responses to such challenges. In order to
quantify the entropy, we look at the inter-chip Hamming distance of PUF responses
to challenges in different partitions. For the 12 available FPGAs, 66 distinct pairing
of FPGAs can be selected. However, since the tuning level of each PUF on FPGA
is different, the challenge set is selected based on the target FPGA. For example,
the challenge set for the pair FPGA A and FPGA B is different from FPGA B
and FPGA A. This asymmetric challenge selection requirement also means that the
inter-chip Hamming distance between FPGA A and FPGA B might be different from
FPGA B and FPGA A. Therefore, we investigate the Hamming distance for all 12×11
possible pairing (of course excluding similar chip parings). At each partition, a set
of 3200 response vectors of size 16 bits are compared to another set. The result is
3200 integer hamming distances between 0 and 16. We take the average value as the
inter-chip hamming distance and normalize it with 16. Next we need to link entropy
with Hamming distance. Entropy is maximum if the average normalized inter-chip
hamming distance is at 0.5. Any deviation from 0.5 lowers the entropy. In other
words, both Hamming distance of 0 and 1 indicate entropy of zero. Figure shows
the entropy as measured by Hamming distance for response to challenges in each
partition. Each line on this figure corresponds to one paring of FPGAs.
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4.9.8 Correlation between effects of temperature and power supply vari-
ations
Variation of temperature and/or core voltage from nominal values changes the re-
sponse to challenges, especially the non-robust challenges. We argue that response
flips due to change in temperature is related to response flips due to change in core
voltage. Temperature testing is expensive; if a correlation between variation due to
temperature and variation due to core voltage can be established even partially, it
will help predict temperature effects from core voltage effects and thus lead to a huge
cost saving.
The 64000x16 responses for each of the 12 FPGA under various experimental con-
ditions (different temperature and voltage) are used to quantify this argument. The
response set obtained in a reference condition is compared to the response set obtained
in condition N1 and the challenges for which the response flips are noted, where N1
condition being an increment (or decrement) in core voltage from the reference value.
Then the response set obtained in reference condition are compared to the response
set obtained in N2 condition only for the challenges noted in N1, where N2 condition
being an increment (or decrement) in temperature from the reference value. In other
words, if the response to challenge ”C”, flips (changes from 0/1 to 1/0) as the power
supply goes from V1 to V2, how likely is it that the response to the same challenge
”C”, flips as the temperature goes from T1 to T2 (while the core voltage stays at V1).
Each PUF is set at a characteristic tuning level for which it has an equal probability
of 0 or 1 as an output and the response set is analyzed at that characteristic tuning
level to obtain a response error correlation value. (T1, V1) and (T2, V2) comprise
the condition N1 and N2 respectively. Figure 4.31 shows the results as boxplot for
18 different experimental conditions tabulated in Table 4.3. The low/high values for
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Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
T1 L M L L M L L M L M H H M H H M H H
T2 M H H M H H M H H L M L L M L L M L
V1 L L L M M M L L L M M M H H H H H H
V2 M M M H H H H H H L L L M M M L L L
Table 4.3 : 18 correlation cases studies for various increments/decrements on temper-
ature and power supply
core voltage are set assuming a practical tolerance level of 5% in power supply. Low
(L), medium (M) and high (H) values for core voltage are 0.95V, 1.00V and 1.05V
respectively and for temperature are 5o C, 35o C and 65o C respectively.”
Each box in Figure 4.31 represents the result of the corresponding case and is
drawn for the set response error correlation values obtained from 12×16 PUF response
sets. The lower and upper edges represent the 25th and 75th percentile respectively
while the edge partitioning the box at the centre is the median correlation value
from the set of 192 correlation values which is used to quantify this response error
correlation. Correlation between voltage and temperature is maximized in case 16
(0.68355), while the correlation in case 7 is also comparable (0.66355). It is interesting
to note that case 16 and case 7 are complementary, i.e. (T1, V1) are interchanged
with (T2, V2).
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Figure 4.20 : The measured delay of 32×32 circuit under tests containing a PDL with
PDL control inputs being set to (a) A2−6 = 00000 and (b) A2−6 = 11111 respectively.
The difference between the delays in these two cases is shown in (c).
(a) (b)
Figure 4.21 : Routing and placement of the PUF (a) first segment (b) last segment.
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Figure 4.22 : Measurement system setup diagram.
Figure 4.23 : Lab setup.
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Figure 4.24 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 6.
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Figure 4.25 : Distribution of the tuning levels across all PUF rows on all FPGAs for
different operating conditions.
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Figure 4.26 : The probability of majority voting system output being equal to 1 as a
function of the delay difference.
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Figure 4.27 : The sharpness (σ) of the transition slope versus the number of repetitions
for majority voting.
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Figure 4.28 : Response stability measured across different challenge partitions with
reference to eight operating condition corner cases for FPGA 6.
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Figure 4.29 : Boxplot showing the distribution of error rates for a given operating
condition corner and challenge partition.
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Figure 4.30 : Entropy of the response to the challenges at each robustness partition.
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ations on responses for 18 different scenarios. Each box plot is made of response
correlation values across 12x16 PUFs.
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Chapter 5
PUFs based on current variations
5.1 Concept and circuit realization
In this section, we present the concept and circuit architecture of the new low power
current-based PUF. Figure A.1(a) depicts the conceptual architecture of our new
PUF circuit. First, process sensitive (PV) voltages/currents are generated. These
quantities should ideally be as much sensitive to process parameters as possible but
highly insensitive to environmental parameters such as temperature to achieve high
levels of response stability and robustness. Next, based on a given input challenge, a
subset of these voltages/currents are selected and combined. The combined quantities
are compared and converted to digital responses. The comparator maybe tuned for
maximum accuracy and reliability based on the predicted statistics of the compared
signals.
The circuit implementation of the proposed PUF concept is shown in Figure 5.2.
In this implementation, process sensitive currents are generated by using individual
FETs whose gate voltages are tied to a fixed voltage source. Next, based on the input
challenge that drive the differential current switches, a subset of currents are selected
and combined. In other words, by connecting the outputs of the current switches as
illustrated in Figure 5.2 and controlling the inputs to the current switches, we can
select and add up a subset of currents into either left and right side of the circuit
which accordingly flows into the left and right inputs of the sense amplifier. Note
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Figure 5.1 : The conceptual block diagram of the proposed PUF structure.
that if both input challenges to a current switch are set to ‘0’ (ground) no current
will flow to either left or right sides. Additionally if both input challenge bits are set
to ‘1’ (VDD), then half of the total current that enters the current switch will flow
through each side. If input challenge bit on one side is ‘0’ and ‘1’ on the other side,
the total current that enters the current switch from the bottom single FET current
generator will be stirred to the latter side. Equations 5.1 and 2 formally express each
current in terms of the inputs to the current switch.
Ia[i] =

I[i], if Ca[i] = 1 and Cb[i] = 0;
0.5I[i], if Ca[i] = 1 and Cb[i] = 1;
0, if Ca[i] = 0 and Cb[i] = X ;
(5.1)
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Ib[i] =

I[i], if Ca[i] = 0 and Cb[i] = 1;
0.5I[i], if Ca[i] = 1 and Cb[i] = 1;
0, if Ca[i] = X and Cb[i] = 0;
(5.2)
...
...
Figure 5.2 : The proposed current based PUF system.
The ‘X’s in Equation 5.1 and 2 represent ‘don’t-care’. Ia[i] and Ib[i] denote the left
and right output currents of the i-th current switch respectively. Also Ca[i] and Cb[i]
respectively represent the left and right inputs to the i-th current switch. Therefore
the total current on the left side, i.e. Ia in Figure 5.2, and on the right side, i.e. Ib
in Figure 5.2, can be written as the sum of each individual current on each side,
Ia =
N∑
i=1
Ia[i], Ib =
N∑
i=1
Ib[i] (5.3)
where N is the total number of PV current generator FETs (or current switches).
Now, the total current on both sides flows into a latch-based sense amplifier. The
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sense amplifier, based on which current is larger, will produce a zero or one digital
response, i.e.,
response =

1, if Ia > Ib;
0, if otherwise;
(5.4)
The latch-based sense amplifier used in the PUF system in effect consists of a pair of
back-to-back connected inverters. Initially, the output of the inverters are pulled up to
VDD by the trigger signal, charging the output node capacitance. Once the challenges
are applied, trigger signal goes to zero releasing the output nodes. Soon after the
currents start flowing though both sides of the sense amplifier, the output capacitance
begin discharging. The discharge pace of the node capacitances is a function of each
current magnitude; i.e., the larger the current, the faster the discharge. Whichever
node voltage drops first by Vth turns on the top inverter transistor and establishes a
positive feedback which settles to a response. After the sense amplifier settles, one of
the transistors in each inverters turns off and the current flow stops automatically.
In order to avoid any bias and predictability of the output responses and to achieve
maximum randomness in responses, the mean/nominal value of the compared currents
must be the same. Meeting such property requires the number of combined currents
on each side or equivalently the number of ones in the right and left input challenges
to be equal, i.e.,
N∑
i=1
Ca[i] =
N∑
i=1
Cb[i]. (5.5)
In case of existence of any bias in sense amplifier operation, calibration and tuning
can be performed by introducing imbalances in Equality 5.5 to have more the number
of ones in challenges (larger the nominal current value) on the desired side. This
degree of freedom can also be used to sift and distinguish the robust challenges from
unstable challenges [16].
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5.2 Experimental results
In this section, the evaluation results for the new PUF architecture are presented. We
simulate the system with N=64 current generators (and current switches) using IBM
90nm technology models. To achieve maximum level of variability, the device sizes
are set to the technology minimum of W/L = 120nm/100nm. Using Monte Carlo
simulation guided by the IBM statistical models, 100 circuit instances are generated.
Next, we apply 100 challenges to each PUF circuit instance at frequency of 100MHz
and the responses to the applied challenges are evaluated and stored. We refer to this
setup as the base experiment. In what follows, we run multiple instances of the basic
experiment under different scenarios and operational conditions. Figure 5.3 shows
the sense amplifier response waveform to a series of random input challenges.
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Figure 5.3 : The sense amplifier output response waveform to a set of random chal-
lenges.
The first experiment consists of twelve base experiment runs under the combina-
tion of the following two sets of scenarios; In the first set of scenarios, the number of
active currents on each side is set to 8, 16, 32 (the number of ones in each challenge
vector, i.e., K =
∑N
i=1C
a[i] =
∑N
i=1C
b[i] where K = {8, 16, 32}). In the second set
of seniors, the gate voltage of the current-generator FETs (Vgate) is set at different
ratios of VDD, i.e. Vgate = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}× VDD. All of the base experiments are
performed under normal operating conditions i.e. temperature of 25oC and VDD=1.2
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volts. Therefore, if we define E1 as the set of scenarios for the first experiment, then
E1 = {Sk,v | (k, v) ∈ K × Vgate}, where Sk,v is the experiment scenario under a given
k and v.
For each experiment the number of ’1’s in 100 responses is counted and normalized
to 100. Ideally, we would like to have equal number of ones and zeros in responses for
highest level of randomness (see [2]). Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of this value
across the 100 PUF instances versus different gate voltages for different number of
active currents using boxplots. The central mark on the boxplot denotes the median,
the edges of the boxes correspond to the 25th and 75th percentiles, the whiskers extent
to the most extreme data points and the red plus signs show the outlier points. As
it can be observed on the plots, for Vgate/VDD = 0.1 the responses are highly biased
toward ‘1’. A closer investigation reveals that the for this gate voltage, the generated
currents are too small to provoke any response from the sense amplifier.
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Figure 5.4 : The distribution of number of ‘1’s in responses to 100 challenges over
100 PUFs obtained from pre-layout monte-carlo simulation
The goal of the second and third experiments is to find the operation parameters
which achieves the highest level of robustness against the fluctuations in tempera-
ture and supply voltage. Similar to the previous experiment, we first define a set
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Figure 5.5 : The distribution of number of ‘1’s in responses to 100 challenges over
100 PUFs obtained from post-layout monte-carlo simulation
of scenarios under which we run the base experiment. Let us denote the second set
of experiments by E2 such that E2 = {Sk,v,t | (k, v, t) ∈ K × Vgate × T} where T
= {−55, 125} are the operating temperatures in Celsius degrees, and K and Vgate
are the sets defined previously. Next the responses from experiments in scenarios
{Sk,v,t | t = −55} are compared to the responses from {Sk,v,t | t = 125} for all k, v
and the discrepancies and differences are counted and normalized to the total number
of responses (=100). Note that the same challenges are applied to the PUF in each
experiment. These two low and high temperatures correspond to standard military
operational conditions. The same experiment is repeated for T = {−40, 85} and
T = {0, 75} each corresponding to industrial and commercial operational conditions
respectively. The plots on the top row of Figure 5.6 depict the results of this ex-
periment. The ‘y’ axis on each plot shows the error rate in the responses averaged
over the 100 PUF instances and the ‘x’ axis corresponds to the gate voltage of the
current generator FETs. The lines on each plot marked by stars, circles, and dots
correspond to commercial, industrial and military operational conditions respectively.
The columns in the plot from left to right correspond to the cases where 8, 16, and 32
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currents are activated, combined, and compared. As it can be observed, increasing
the gate voltage of the current generator FETs raises the response error rates and
thus reduces the level of robustness in responses. Moreover, the results suggest that
as larger number of currents are combined, the error rate also increases. Note that
the error rates for Vgate/VDD = 0.1 are invalid due to the large bias in the responses
as shown in Figure 5.4. The plots in the bottom row of of Figure 5.6 present the
same results, however, this time the temperature is fixed to 25oC and supply voltage
is varied in three intervals of VDD = {1.1, 1.2}, VDD = {1.1, 1.3}, and VDD = {1, 1.4}.
The same conclusions apply to these results as well. Finally, note that the lowest error
rate can be achieved for the smallest sub-threshold currents that are large enough to
drive the sense amplifier. The PUF consumes 150 µWatt for a duration of 250 ps per
each response bit.
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Figure 5.6 : The average response error rate as a function of the current generator
transistor gate voltage obtained from pre-layout monte-carlo simulation.
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Figure 5.7 : The average response error rate as a function of the current generator
transistor gate voltage obtained from pre-layout monte-carlo simulation.
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Figure 5.8 : The inter-die and intra-die response distance distribution under different
usage scenarios.
Figure 5.9 : The floor planning of the PUF components on the die.
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Figure 5.10 : (a) The PUF chip layout. (b) taped-out chip micrograph
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Chapter 6
Authentication Protocols
6.1 Authentication Protocol
In this section, we show how the extracted cell characteristics in Section 4.1 can be
utilized for FPGA authentication. The following terminology is used in the remainder
of the thesis. The verifier (V ) authenticates the prover (P ) who owns the genuine
FPGA device. The verifier authenticates the device by verifying the unique timing
properties of the device.
6.1.1 Classic Authentication
The registration and authentication processes for the classic authentication case are
demonstrated in the diagram in Figure 6.1(a) and (b) (disregard the darker boxes
for now). The minimum required assumptions for this case are: (i) the verifier is not
constrained in power, (ii) it is physically impossible to clone the FPGA, and (iii) the
characteristics of the FPGA owned by the prover is a secret only known to the prover
and verifier.
As shown in Figure 6.1(a), during the registration phase, the verifier extracts and
securely stores the cell delay parameters by performing characterization as explained
in Sections 4.1. By knowing the FPGA-specific features in addition to the structure
and placement of the configured PUF, the verifier is able to predict the responses to
any challenges to the PUF. After registrations, the FPGA along with the pertinent
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PUF configuration bitstream is passed to the end-user.
At the authentication, end-user (prover) is queried by the verifier to make sure
she is the true owner of the FPGA. Classic authentication is shown in Figure 6.1(b).
To authenticate the ownership, the verifier utilizes a random seed and generates a
set of pseudorandom challenge vectors for querying the prover. The prover responds
to the challenges she receives from the verifier by applying them to the configured
FPGA hardware. The verifier then compares the received responses from the prover
with the predicted ones, and authenticates the chip if the responses are similar.
To ensure robustness against errors in measuring the delays and the changes in
operational conditions, the registration entity may also compute the error correction
information for the responses to the given challenges. To prevent information leakage
via the error correction bits, secure sketch techniques can be used. A secure sketch
produces public information about its input that does not reveal the input, and still
permits exact recovery of the input given another value that is close to it [49].
The device is authenticated if the response after error correction would be mapped
to the verifier-computed hash of responses. Otherwise, the authentication will fail.
Alternatively, the verifier can allow for some level of errors in the collected responses
and remove the error correction and hashing from the protocol. However, accept-
ing some errors in the responses makes the verifier be more susceptible to emula-
tion/impersonating attacks [1, 2].
6.1.2 Time-bounded Authentication Using Reconfigurability
After the FPGA registration, the verifier is able to compute and predict the responses
to any set of challenges by knowing (i) the cell-level features of the pertinent FPGA,
(ii) the circuit structure, and (iii) placement of the PUF circuit. The information
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Figure 6.1 : (a) FPGA registration (b) Classic authentication flow (c) Time-bound
authentication flow.
on the PUF circuit structure and placement is embedded into the configuration bit-
stream. In the classic authentic method, the bitstream is never changed. A dishonest
prover, off-line and given enough time and resources can (i) extract the cell-level delays
of the FPGA, and (ii) reverse engineer the bitstream to discover the PUF structure
and its placement on the FPGA. During the authentication, the dishonest prover can
compute the responses to the given challenges online by simulating the behavior of
the PUF on the fly and producing the responses that pass the authentication.
A stronger set of security protocols can be built upon the fact that the prover is
the only entity who can compute the correct response to a random challenge within a
specific time bound since he has access to the actual hardware. In this protocol, prior
to the beginning of the authentication session, the FPGA is blank. The verifier then
sends a bitstream to the device in which a random subset of LUTs are configured for
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authentication. After the device is configured, the verifier starts querying the FPGA
with random challenges. The verifier accepts the responses that are returned back
only if ∆t ≤ ∆tmax where ∆t is the time elapsed on the prover device to compute the
responses after receiving the configuration bitstream, and ∆tmax is the upper bound
delay estimated computation of responses by the authentic FPGA prover device,
which is composed of device configuration, response generation, error correction, and
hashing time all performed in hardware.
The verifier will authenticate the device only if the time the device takes to gen-
erate the response is less than ∆tmax. We denote the minimum emulation time by
temumin , where t
emu
min >> ∆tmax. Time-bounded authentication protocol can be added to
the authentication flow, as demonstrated in Figure 6.1(c). Compared to the classic
authentication flow, a time bound check is added after the hash function. While per-
forming the above authentication, we emphasize on the assumption that the time gap
between hardware response generation and simulation (or emulations) of the prover
must be larger than the variation in the channel latency. The time-bound assumption
would be enough for providing the authentication proof [9, 30, 60].
Estimating the time-bound
Now let us look at∆t, the time elapsed on the prover device to compute the responses.
Before proceeding, note that the characterization is a one-time oﬄine operation which
happens prior to authentication phase and its time complexity does not affect the
time-bound discussed here. ∆t is the sum of time required to configure the FPGA,
Tconf , and the time spent on evaluating the PUF, Teval, i.e., ∆t = Tconf+Teval. During
the PUF evaluation, Np clock pulses at Nf distinct frequencies are sent to Ncell PUF
cells in serial with an average pulse width of Tavg , therefore the average evaluation
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time is, Teval = Np × Ncell × Nf × Tavg. For instance, in our experiments, Np = 8,
Np = 6, Ncell = 1024, and Tavg = 2ns, yielding Teval * 98µseconds.
Configuration time varies for different configuration schemes and depends on the
configuration file size, configuration port width, and frequency of the driving clock.
Configuration time can roughly be estimated by Tconf =
Lb
fc×Pw , where Lb is the
configuration bitstream length in bits, fc is the clock frequency in Hz, and Pw is the
configuration port width in bits. For example, In our experiment on Xilinx Virtex
5 FPGAs (LX110), Lb=3.5MB, fc=50MHz and Pw=16bit, the configuration time
equals 350 milli-seconds. Faster clocks can expedite the configuration process.
6.2 Attacks and Countermeasures
Perhaps the most dangerous attack to an authentication system is impersonation
attack. Impersonation attack aims at deceiving the verifier to get through the au-
thentication by reverse-engineering and simulation of the authentic device behavior,
or storing and replaying the communication, or random guessing. Storage and reply
attacks are impractical as long as the verifier uses a new random challenge every
time. Random guessing and prediction attacks pose a threat if the responses have
a low entropy and are predictable. As we mentioned in Section 4.2, by setting the
input clock pulse widths to the statistical median of the center of transition regions,
the entropy of the responses can be maximized. For a fixed binary challenge, there
are not more than six independent input clock pulse widths to be tried. In other
words, the responses to other input clock pulse widths would lack sufficient entropy.
To obtain more response bits, more binary challenges must be used instead.
Among the aforementioned threats, the reverse engineering and simulation at-
tacks are the most critical attacks to address. The time-bounded protocol discussed
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in Section 6.3 is constructed based on secrecy in placement of the PUF and the con-
nection of the input challenges to the CUTs. The secret expires within the given
time bound. To provide the correct response to a new challenge, the adversary has to
reverse engineer the bitstream to decipher the placement and connection of the input
challenges to the PUF. Next, he has to simulate (or emulate) the PUF behavior using
the public timing characterization. These two steps must be performed within the
given time constraint. Even after many years of research in rapid simulation tech-
nologies for hardware design and validation, accurate simulation or emulation of a
hardware architecture is extremely slow compared to the real device. In addition,
even though bitstream reverse-engineering have partially been performed on some
FPGAs [61], performing it would require a lot of simulations and pattern matching.
Thus, it would take many more cycles than the authentic hardware where the verify-
ing time is dominated by the bitstream configuration time (in the order of 100 mili
seconds).
6.3 Slender PUF Protocol
In this section, the proposed protocol is introduced and explained in detail. The
protocol is based on a Strong PUF with acceptable statistical properties, like the one
shown in Fig. 6.2. The protocol enables a prover with physical access to the PUF to
authenticate itself to a verifier. It is assumed that an honest verifier has access to
a compact secret model of the relationship between Strong PUF challenge-response
pairs (CRPs). Such a model can be built by training a compact parametric model of
the PUF on a set of direct challenge responses pairs. As long as the PUF challenge
response pairs are obtained from the linear PUF, right after the arbiter, building
and training such a compact model is possible with a relatively small set of CRPs as
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demonstrated in the previous literature [40, 42, 43, 2, 44]. The physical access to the
measurement points should be then permanently disabled before deployment, e.g., by
burning irreversible fuses, so other entities cannot build the same models. Once this
access point is blocked, any physical attack that involves de-packaging the chip will
likely alter the shared secret.
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Cn Cn-1 Cn-2 C0
Figure 6.2 : Two independent linear arbiter PUFs are XOR-mixed in order to imple-
ment an arbiter PUF with better statistical properties.
The Slender PUF methodology is different from the original PUF challenge re-
sponse pair identification and authentication methodology. The Slender PUF method-
ology is devised such that both prover and verifier jointly participate in producing
the challenges. The joint challenge generation provides effective protection against a
number of attacks. Unlike original PUF authentication methods, an adversary cannot
build a database of CRPs and use an entry in the database for authentication.
In the next step of the protocol, the prover generates a set of Strong PUF responses
corresponding to the jointly generated challenges. After that, the prover selects a
random substring of responses from the response super-string, without revealing the
location in the response stream and sends it to the verifier. The verifier, with access to
the secret compact PUF model, can perform substring matching, within a predefined
error threshold, and validate the responses with a very high probability. The prover
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gets authenticated if his submitted response substring matches at any location in the
simulated response super-string on the verifier side.
6.3.1 Slender PUF protocol steps
Fig. 6.3 illustrates the steps of the Slender PUF protocol. Steps 1-4 of the protocol
ensure joint generation of the challenges by the prover and the verifier. In Steps 1-2
the prover and the verifier each uses its own true random number generator (TRNG)
unit to generate a nonce. Note that arbiter PUFs can also be used to implement a
TRNG [10]. The prover and verifier generated nonces are denoted by Noncep and
Noncev respectively. The nonces are exchanged between the parties, so both entities
have access to Noncep and Noncev. Step 3 generates a random seed by concatenating
the individual nonces of the prover and the verifier; i.e., Seed = {Noncev ‖ Noncep}.
The generated Seed is used by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) in
Step 4. Both the prover and the verifier have a copy of this PRNG module. The
PRNG output using the seed, i.e., C = G(Seed), is then applied to the PUF as a
challenge set (C). Note that in this way, neither the prover nor the verifier has full
control over the PUF challenge stream. In Step 5, the prover applies the challenges
to its physical PUF to obtain a response stream (R); i.e., R = PUF(C). An honest
verifier with access to a secret compact model of the PUF (PUF model) also estimates
the PUF output stream; i.e., R
′
= PUF model(C).
Let us assume that the full response bitstring is of length L. In Step 6, the prover
randomly chooses an index (ind) of bit-size log2(L) that points to a location in the
full response bitstring. The index is used to generate a substring W from the PUF
output bitstream with a predefined length, denoted by Lsub. We use the full response
string in a circular manner, so that if the value (ind + L) > log2(L), the remainder
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Verifier Prover
Noncep
Seed ={Noncev, Noncep} Seed = {Noncev, Noncep}
C = G(Seed) C = G(Seed)
R’ = PUF_model(C) R = PUF(C)
W = sub-seq (ind, Lsub, R)
(3)
(4)
(2)
(6)
(5)
Noncev(1)
T =match(R’, W, e)
Auth. pass: T = true? 
(7)
Figure 6.3 : The 7 steps of the SlenderPUF lightweight protocol.
of the substring values are taken from the beginning of the full response bitstream.
The prover then sends W to the verifier. In step 7, an honest verifier, with
access to the compact secret PUF model, finds the secret index by searching and
matching the received substring to its simulated PUF output sequence (R
′
). The
authentication is successful, only if the Hamming distance between the received and
the simulated substrings is lower than a predefined threshold value. In this way,
prover does not reveal the whole response stream and the protocol leaks a minimal
amount of information. This process is illustrated in Fig. 6.4.
The SlenderPUF protocol is lightweight and is suitable for ultra-low power and
embedded devices. Besides a Strong PUF, the prover only needs to implement one
TRNG and one PRNG. The information communicated between the parties is also
minimal. In addition to exchanging their respective session nonces, the prover only
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Figure 6.4 : Top: random selection of an index; Middle: extracting a substring
of a predefined length; Bottom: the verifier matches the received substrings to its
estimated PUF response stream.
needs to send a relatively short substring to the verifier.
6.3.2 Secret sharing
So far we assumed that the verifier possesses a model of the PUF and uses the model
to authenticate the prover. The PUF in fact uses an e-fuse to protect the secret
and prevent modeling attacks. The chip sets are handled by a trusted party before
distributing to end users. The trusted party performs modeling on the PUF and
disables the fuse before distribution. Anyone with access to the IC afterwards will
not be able to model the PUF since the fuse is disabled. The trusted party can share
the PUF models with other authorized trusted parties that want to authenticate the
ICs.
The e-fuse mechanism is set up as follows. Before the e-fuse is disabled, the output
of the arbiter prior to any XORs can be read and accessed from chip IO pins. This
way, the verifier can obtain as many CRPs as needed to build an accurate model of
the PUF. After the model is successfully trained, the trusted party and/or the verifier
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disables the e-fuse so that no one can obtain the “raw” PUF output.
6.4 Analysis of attacks
In this section, we quantify the resistance of the proposed protocol against different
attacks by a malicious party (prover or verifier). First, we quantitatively analyze
the resiliency of the method to machine learning and modeling attacks. Second, we
probabilistically investigate the odds of authentication by random guessing. Third,
we address the attack where a dishonest prover (verifier) attempts to control the PUF
challenge pattern. Lastly, the effects of non-idealities of PUFs and PRNGs and their
impact on protocol security are discussed.
Throughout our analysis in this section, we investigate the impact of various
parameters on security and reliability of protocol operation. Table 6.1 shows the list
of parameters.
6.4.1 PUF modeling attack
In order to model a linear PUF with a given level of accuracy, it is sufficient to ob-
tain a minimum number (Nmin) of direct challenge response pairs (CRPs) from the
PUF. Based on theoretical considerations (dimension of the feature space, Vapnik-
Chervonenkis dimension), it is suggested in [44] that the minimal number of CRPs,
Nmin, that is necessary to model a N -stage delay based linear PUF with a misclassi-
fication rate of $ is given by:
Nmin = O(
N
$
). (6.1)
For example, a PUF model with 90% accuracy, has a misclassification rate of $ =
10%. In the proposed protocol, the direct responses are not revealed and the attacker
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Table 6.1 : List of design parameters
Parameter notation Description
L Length of PUF response string
Lsub Length of PUF response substring
Ln Length of the nonce
ind Index value, 0 ≤ ind < L
Nmin Minimum number CRPs needed to train
the PUF model with a misclassification
rate of less than $
k Number of XORed PUF outputs
N Number of PUF switch stages
th Matching distance threshold
$ PUF modeling misclassification rate
perr Probability of error in PUF responses
needs to correctly guess the secret index to be able to discover Lsub challenge response
pairs. The index is a number between 0 and L − 1 (L is the length of the original
response string from which the substring is obtained). Assuming the attacker tries to
randomly guess the index, then he is faced by L choices. For each index choice, the
attacker can build a PUF model (Mindex) by training it on the set of Lsub challenge
response pairs using machine learning methods.
Now, the attacker could launch L rounds of authentication with the verifier and
each time use one of his trained models instead of the actual PUF. If he correctly
guesses the index and his model is accurate enough, one of his models will pass
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authentication. To build an accurate model as mentioned above, the attacker needs
to obtain Nmin correct challenge response pairs. If Lsub > Nmin, then attacker can
break the system with O(L) number of attempts. However if Lsub < Nmin, then the
attackers needs to launch Nmin/Lsub multiple rounds of authentication to obtain at
least Nmin challenge response pairs. Under this scenario, the number of hypothetical
PUF models will grow exponentially. Since for each round of authentication there
are L models based on the choice of index value, for Nmin/Lsub rounds, the number
of models will be of the following order:
O(L
Nmin
Lsub ). (6.2)
From the above equation, it seems intuitive to choose small values for Lsub to
make the exponent bigger. However, small Lsub increases the success rate of random
guessing attacks. The implications of small Lsub will be discussed in more detail in
the next section.
The model the attacker is building has to be only more accurate than the specified
threshold during the matching. For example, if we allow a 10% tolerance during the
substring matching process, then it means that a PUF model that emulates the actual
PUF responses with more than 90% accuracy will be able to pass authentication.
Based on Equation 6.1, if we allow higher misclassification rate $, then a smaller
number of CRPs is needed to build an accurate enough model which passes the
authentication.
For example, based on the numbers reported in [44], using 640 CRPs, an arbiter
PUF of length 64 can be modeled with an accuracy of 95%. In this example we set the
threshold to 5%, then to get an exponent equal to 10 from Equation 6.2, Lsub must
be 64. In other words, the attacker needs to performs L10 operations to obtain 640
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CRPs so that he can build a PUF model of 95% accuracy to pass the authentication.
For L=1024, L10 will be a huge number. However we are faced with another problem.
What if the PUF error rate (perr) is higher than the maximum Hamming distance
threshold (th)? Then we will have a lot of false negatives (i.e., the honest prover with
access to the legitimate PUF will not be able to pass authentication due to noise in
responses).
To improve the security while maintaining reliable performance, Nmin must be
increased for a fixed $ and N . This requires a structural change to delay based PUF.
In this work, we use the XOR PUF circuit shown in Figure 6.2 for two reasons. First,
to satisfy the avalanche criterion for the PUF. Second, to increase Nmin for a fixed $.
Based on the results reported in [44], Nmin is an order of magnitude larger for XOR
PUF compared to a simple delay based PUF.
6.4.2 Random guessing attack
A legitimate prover should be able to generate a substring of PUF responses that
successfully match a substring of the verifier’s emulated response sequence. The legit-
imate prover must be authenticated by an honest verifier with a very high probability,
even if the response substring contains some errors. Therefore, the protocol allows
some tolerance during matching by setting a threshold on the Hamming distance of
the source and target substrings.
Simultaneously, the probability of authenticating a dishonest prover should be
extremely low. These conditions can be fulfilled by carefully selecting the Hamming
distance threshold (th), the substring length (Lsub) and the original response string
length (L) by our protocol.
A dishonest prover without access to the original PUF or its model, may resort
100
to sending a substring of random bits. In this case, the probability of authenticating
a randomly guessing attacker would be:
Pauth,guessing ≤ L×
Lsub∑
i=Lsub−th
(
Lsub
i
)
1
2
i
· 1
2
Lsub−i
, (6.3)
where Lsub and th are the length of the substring and the Hamming distance threshold,
respectively. Note that Eq. 6.3 is a binomial cumulative distribution function. For
an honest prover, the probability of being authenticated is:
Pauth,honest *
Lsub∑
i=Lsub−th
(
Lsub
i
)
(1− perr)i · perrLsub−i, (6.4)
where perr is the probability of an error in a response bit. If Lsub is chosen to be a
sufficiently large number, Eq. 6.3 will be close to zero and Eq. 6.4 will be close to one.
6.4.3 Compromising the random seed
In Slender PUF protocol, the prover and the verifier jointly generate the random
PRNG seed by concatenating the outputs of their individual nonces (generated by
TRNGs); i.e., seed = {Noncev ‖ Noncep}. The stream of PRNG outputs after
applying the seed is then used as the PUF challenge set. This way, neither the prover
nor the verifier has full control over generating the PUF challenge stream.
If one of the parties can fully control the seed and challenge sequence, then the
following attack scenario can happen. A dishonest verifier can manipulate an honest
prover into revealing the secret information. If the same seed is used over and over
during authentication rounds, then the generated response sequence (super-string)
will always be the same. The response substrings now come from the same original
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response string. By collecting a large enough number of substrings and putting the
pieces together, the original super-string can be reconstructed. Reconstruction will
reveal L CRPs. By repeating these steps more CRPs can be revealed and the PUF
can be ultimately modeled.
A dishonest prover (verifier) may intentionally keep his/her portion of the seed
constant to reduce the entropy of seed. This way, the attacker can exert more control
over the random challenges applied to the PUF. We argue that if the seed length is
long enough this strategy will not be successful.
This attack leaves only half of the bits in the generated Seed changing. For a seed
of length 2Ln-bits (two concatenated nonces of length Ln-bits), the chance that the
same nonce appears twice is 12Ln ). For example, for Ln = |Noncev| = |Noncep| = 128,
the probability of being able to fully control the seed will be negligibly small.
Therefore, one could effectively guard against any kind of random seed compromise
by increasing the nonce lengths. The only overhead of this approach is a twofold
increase in the runtime of the TRNG.
6.4.4 Substring replay attack
A dishonest prover may mount an attack by recording the substrings associated with
each used Seed. In this attack, a malicious prover records the response substrings
sent by an honest prover to an honest verifier for a specific Seed. The recording may
be performed by eavesdropping on the communication channel between the legitimate
prover and verifier. A malicious party may even pre-record a set of response substrings
to various random Seeds by posing as a legitimate verifier and exchanging nonces with
the authentic prover.
After recording a sufficiently large number of Seeds and their corresponding re-
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sponse substrings, the malicious party could attempt to impersonate an honest prover.
This may done by repeatedly contacting the legitimate verifier for authentication and
then matching the generated Seeds to its pre-recorded database. This attack could
only happen if the Seeds collide. Selecting a sufficiently long Seed that cannot be
controlled by one party (Subsection 6.4.2) would hinder this collision attack.
Passive eavesdropping is performed during the pre-recording phase, the chances
that the whole Seed collides will be 1/2Ln . The worst-case scenario is when an
adversary impersonates a verifier and controls half of the seed which reduces the
collision probability to 1/2Ln/2.
6.4.5 Exploiting non-idealities of PRNG and PUF
Thus far, we assumed that the outputs of PRNG and PUF are ideal and statistically
unbiased. If this is not true, an attacker may resort to exploiting the statistical bias
in a non-ideal PRNG or PUF to attack the system. Therefore, in this section we
emphasize the importance of the PUF avalanche criterion for securing against this
class of attacks.
If the PUF has poor statistical properties, then the attacker can predict patterns
in the generated responses. The attacker can use these predicted patterns to more
confidently find/guess a matching location for the substring. In other words, statisti-
cal bias in the responses will leak information about the location index of the response
substring.
Recall that an ideal Strong PUF should have the strict avalanche property [9].
This property states that if one bit of the PUF’s input challenges is flipped, the
PUF output response should flip with a 12 probability. If this property holds, the
PUF output for two different challenges will be uncorrelated. Fig. 6.5 shows the
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probability of output flipping versus the Hamming distance between two challenge
sequences for the Strong PUF proposed in [9]. It is desirable to make this probability
as close as possible to 12 .
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Figure 6.5 : The probability of the arbiter PUF output flipping versus the Hamming
distance between two challenge sequences for 2, 4, and 8 independent XOR-mixed
PUFs [2]
The figure shows that this probability is very close to the ideal number when at
least four independent PUF output bits are mixed by an XOR. As more independent
PUF response bits are mixed, the curve moves closer to the ideal case; however, this
linearly increases the probability of error in the mixed output bit. For instance, for a
single Strong PUF response bit error of 5%, the probability of error for 4-XOR mixing
is reported to be 19% in [9].
In our implementation of Slender PUF protocol, Linear feedback shift registers
(LFSRs) are used as a lightweight PRNG. An ideal LFSR must have the maximum
length sequence property [62]. This property ensures that the autocorrelation func-
tion of the LFSR output stream is “impulsive”, i.e., it is one at lag zero and is −1N for
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all other lags, where N is the LFSR sequences length. N should be a sufficiently large
number, which renders the lagged autocorrelations very close to zero [62]. Therefore,
if an LFSR generates a sequence of challenges to the PUF, the challenges are uncor-
related. In other words, for an ideal LFSR, it is highly unlikely that an attacker can
find two challenges with a very small Hamming distance.
Even if the attacker finds two challenges with a small Hamming distance in the
sequence, Fig. 6.5 shows that the output of our proposed PUF would be sufficiently
uncorrelated to the Hamming distance of the input challenges. Therefore, a combina-
tion of PRNG and PUF with strict avalanche criteria would make this attack highly
unlikely. It is worth noting that it is not required by any means the PRNG to be a
cryptographically secure generator. The seed in the protocol is public and the only
purpose of the PRNG is to automatically generate a sequence of challenge vectors.
Simultaneously, it must not allow an attacker to completely control the challenges
and thus the responses.
6.5 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we use the PUF measurement data collected in the lab to estimate
the practical protocol parameters values and present methodology to arrive at the
parameter values. False acceptance and false rejection probabilities depend on PUF
error rates. Unfortunately, there has been no comprehensive reports till this date
on PUF response error rates (caused by variations in temperature and power supply
conditions) nor any solid data on modeling error rates measured on real PUF challenge
response pairs. The data reported in the related literature mainly come from synthetic
(emulated) PUF results rather than actual reliable PUF measurements and tests.
We used the data we measured and collected across 12 Xilinx Virtex 5 (LX110)
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FPGAs at 9 accurately controlled operating condition (combination of different tem-
peratures and power supply points). Each PUF holds 16 PUFs and each PUF is
tested using 64,000 random challenges.
To obtain the error rate, each PUF evaluation at nominal condition (temperature
= 35oC and VDD = 1 V) is repeated 128 times and then majority of the response
values to the same challenge is taken as the ideal response of PUF. Then the variation
from the ideal response is measured compared as the percentage of the bits in the 128-
bit vector that deviate from the ideal response. For example if 10 bits from the 128
bits are ones and the rest are zeros, and the deviation from the majority response,
or the response error rate, is (10/128)×100 = 7.8%. The same method is used to
measure the response error in different operating condition with respect to the ideal
response at the nominal condition.
The center cell of Table 6.2 shows the average deviation (taken over 64,000 challenge-
response pairs) of these experiments from the ideal response at the nominal condition.
These experiments are also repeated for different voltage and temperature conditions
and then the average deviation of these outputs from the ideal PUF response is re-
ported in Table 6.2. As it can be seen from this table, the error rate can substantially
increase in non-nominal conditions. The worst case scenario happens when the tem-
perature is 5oC and the voltage is 0.95V. The table shows that 30oC degree change
in temperature will have a bigger effect on the error rate than a 5% voltage change.
As mentioned earlier, the verifier repeatedly tests the PUF in the factory to obtain
a consensus of the PUF responses for an array of random challenges. The verifier then
uses the reliable response bits to build a PUF Model for himself. When the PUF is
deployed in the field, the prover challenges its own PUF and send the responses
to the verifier. The average error rate of the prover response in different working
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VDD
Temperature
5oC 35oC 65oC
0.95 V 8.4% 6.2% 7.1%
1.00 V 6.8% 3.1% 6.4%
1.05 V 7.2% 6.7% 7.9%
Table 6.2 : Average bit error rate of PUF in different voltage and temperature con-
ditions in comparison with the ideal PUF output at nominal condition.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
VDD
Temperature
5oC 35oC 65oC
0.95 V 13.2% 10.5% 10.7%
1.00 V 8.9% 6.4% 8.9%
1.05 V 9.3% 10.2% 11.8%
Table 6.3 : Average bit error rate of the Verifiers PUF model against the PUF outputs
in different voltage and temperate conditions.
condition against the verifiers model is listed in Table 6.3. The listed errors are the
superposition of two types of error. The first type is the error in PUF output due
to noise of environment as well as operating condition fluctuations. The second type
is the inevitable modeling error of the verifiers PUF model. These error rates are
tangibly higher than the error rates of Table 6.2. The worst error rate is recorded
at 5oC temperature and voltage of 0.95V. This error rate is taken as the worst-case
error rate between an honest verifier and an honest Prover. We will use this error rate
to estimate the false acceptance and false rejection probability of the authentication
protocol.
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Q: As explained in the thesis, the attack complexity depends exponentially on the
minimum required number of challenge response pairs (CRPs), i.e., Nmin, to reach
a modeling error rate of less than ’th’, the matching threshold in the protocol. The
matching threshold in the protocol is incorporated to create a tolerance for errors in
the responses caused by modeling error as well as errors due to environment variations
and noise.
By relaxing the tolerance for errors in the protocol (i.e., increasing ’th’), we ba-
sically increase the probability of attack. For example, if we allow for 50% error in
during the matching, then any randomly generated response set will pass the au-
thentication. On the contrary, by lowering the tolerance for errors, rate at which
authentication of genuine PUF fails due to noisy responses increases. As a rule of
thumb, the tolerance has to be set greater than the maximum response error rate to
achieve sensible false rejection and false acceptance probabilities.
Once the tolerance level (th) is fixed to achieve the desired false rejection and
false acceptance probabilities, Nmin must be increased to hinder modeling attacks.
However,Nmin and th are inter-related for a given PUF structure. In other words, for
a given fixed PUF structure, increasing th mandates that a less accurate model can
pass the authentication, and that model can be trained with few number of CRPs
(smaller Nmin). The only way to achieve a higher Nmin for a fixed th is to change the
PUF structure.
Earlier in the thesis, we proposed using XOR PUFs instead of a single arbiter-
based PUF in order to increase Nmin for a fixed th. As reported previously in the
related literature, xor-ing the PUF outputs makes the machine learning more difficult
and requires a larger CRP set for model building. The major problem with XORing
the PUF outputs is error propagation. For example, if the outputs of two arbiter-
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VDD
Temperature
5oC 35oC 65oC
0.95 V 24.7% 19.9% 20.3%
1.00 V 17.0% 12.4% 17.0%
1.05 V 17.7% 19.4% 22.2%
Table 6.4 : 2-input XOR.
based PUFs are mixed with XORs, the XOR PUF response error rate will be the sum
of each individual arbiter-based PUFs (minus the multiplication of both error). This
means the error tolerance has to be also doubled to have a reliable operations. This
observation of trade-off between Nmin and th, led us to quantify this effect. It was nor
clear in a practical scenario adding to the number of XORs will make it more difficult
to break the protocol or not, since the data reported in other papers are mainly from
synthetic (emulated) PUF results rather than reliable PUF error rate estimates.
In order to quantify the trade-off between Nmin and th, we first calculate the effec-
tive compound error rate at the XOR PUF output for different operating conditions
and different number of XOR inputs. Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 show the effective response
error rate for 2-input, 3-input, 4-input XOR PUF respectively.
According to the above tables, the maximum error rates measured from the XOR
PUF responses are 24.7%, 34.6%, 43.2% 2-input, 3-input, 4-input XOR PUF respec-
tively. To guarantee reliable authentication at all operating conditions, the error
tolerance th must be set above the maximum error rates. Now after deriving the
error tolerance level for each PUF, we would like to know how many challenge re-
sponse pairs are required to train the PUF model and reach a modeling error that
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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
VDD
Temperature
5oC 35oC 65oC
0.95 V 34.6% 28.3% 28.8%
1.00 V 24.4% 18.0% 24.4%
1.05 V 25.4% 27.6% 31.4%
Table 6.5 : 3-input XOR.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
VDD
Temperature
5oC 35oC 65oC
0.95 V 43.2% 35.8% 36.4%
1.00 V 31.1% 23.2% 31.1%
1.05 V 32.3% 35.0% 39.6%
Table 6.6 : 4-input XOR.
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Figure 6.6 : The modeling error rate for arbiter-based PUF, and XOR PUFs with 2
and 3 outputs as a function of number of train/test CRPs.
falls below the tolerance level. In other words, how many challenge/response pairs
does the adversary need to collect in order to pass the authentication and break the
system?
To answer this question, we trained and tested the PUF model on the data col-
lected in the lab from real PUF implementations. We measured the modeling accuracy
as a function of train/test set size for each PUF. The results in Figure 6.6 show the
modeling error using evolutionary strategy (ES) machine learning method.
Based on the results in Figure 6.6, the largest Nmin for all three PUFs, after taking
into account the error threshold (th) derived earlier, is achieved for XOR-PUF with
3 inputs, i.e. to achieve a modeling error rate of less than 34.6%, 64,000 CRPs must
be collected, therefore Nmin = 64,000 for 3-input XOR PUF.
Table 6.7 shows the false rejection and false acceptance error rate of our protocol
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Lsub 500
Error threshold 210 200 190
False rejection 0.1% 1% 9%
False acceptance 7.1% 1.5% 0.001%
Lsub 1000
Error threshold 395 385 375
False rejection 0.2% 1% 5%
False acceptance 1.1e-8 1.1e-10 8e-13
Lsub 1250
Error threshold 487 477 467
False rejection 0.2% 1% 5%
False acceptance 1.8e-12 0 0
Table 6.7 : False rejection and acceptance error probabilities for different protocol
parameters.
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with the length of substring (Lsub) fixed at 500, with different matching distance
thresholds. False rejection rate is the rate in which the service to the truthful prover
is disrupted. The requirements on the false rejection rate are not usually as stringent
on the requirements on the false acceptance rate, however, one should assume that a
customer would deem a product impractical if the false rejection rate is higher than
a threshold. In our protocol design, we tune the system parameter to achieve a false
negative rate of 1%, while minimizing the false acceptance rate. Also, we take the
worst-case error rate as the basis of our calculation for false acceptance and false
rejection rates. The error rates that we report are the upper bound of what can be
observed in the field by a customer/prover.
Table 6.7 shows that the desired false rejection rate of 1% is achieved when the
threshold is 200 for Lsub=500. However, this results in a false acceptance rate of
1.5%, which is not acceptable. Therefore, the substring length should be increased
in order to achieve a much lower false acceptance probability. Table 6.7 lists these
rates for Lsub = 500, Lsub = 1000, Lsub = 1250. The second column for Lsub = 1250
shows that a false negative rate of 1% and a false positive rate of 0 can be achieved
if error threshold is 477/1250 = 38%. If we set L = 1300, with this parameters, an
adversary needs to perform O(1300(64000/1250)) ≈ O(2527) machine learning attacks in
order to break this system which makes the system secure against all computationally
bounded adversaries.
6.6 Hardware implementation
In this section, we present an FPGA implementation of the proposed protocol for
the prover side on Xilinx Virtex 5 XC5VLX110T FPGAs. Since there is a stricter
power consumption requirement on the lightweight prover, we focus our evaluation
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on prover implementation overhead. The computation on the verifier side can run
solely in software, however, the computation on the verifier may also be carried out
in hardware with negligible overhead.
For the Slender PUF protocol, it is desirable to use a low overhead PUF imple-
mentation, such as the one introduced in [7]. If an ASIC or analog implementation of
the PUF is required, the ultra-low power architecture in [10] is suitable for this pro-
tocol. A very low-power verifier implemented by a microcontroller such as MSP430
can easily challenge the PUF and run the subsequent steps of the protocol.
We use the implementation of the arbiter-based PUF in [16]. The arbiter-based
PUF on FPGA is designed to have 64 input challenges. In total, 128 LUTs and one
flip-flop are used to generate one bit of response. To achieve a higher throughput,
multiple parallel PUFs can be implemented on the same FPGA.
There are various existing implementations for TRNGs on FPGAs [63, 56]. We
use the architecture presented in [7] to implement a true random number generator.
The TRNG architecture is shown in Figure 6.8. This TRNG operates by enforcing a
metastable state on the flipflop through a closed loop feedback system. The TRNG
core consumes 128 LUTs that are packed into 16 CLBs on Virtex 5. In fact, the
TRNG core is identical to the arbiter-based PUF except that the switches act as tun-
able programmable delay lines. The core is incorporated inside a closed-loop feedback
system. The core output is attached to a 12-bit counter (using 12 registers) which
monitors the arbiter’s metastability. If the arbiter operates in a purely metastable
fashion, the output bits become equally likely ones and zeros. The counter basically
measures and monitors deviations from this condition and generates a difference feed-
back signal to guide the system to return back to its metastable state. The counter
output drives an encoding table of depth 212 where each row contains a 128-bit word
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resulting in a 64KByte ROM. A table of size 212 × 8-bits (=4KByte) implemented
by a RAM block is used to gather and update statistics for online post processing.
Tunable PUF Counter
Feedback - Encoder
Post
Processing
TRNG based on arbiter metastability
Figure 6.7 : True random number generation architecture based on flipflop metasta-
bility
The nonce size is set to 128 for both the prover and verifier. Each 128-bit nonce
is fed into a 128-bit LFSR. The content of the two LFSRs are XORed to form the
challenges to the PUF.
The pattern selection can be achieved by shifting the intended substring of the
PUF responses into a FIFO. The shifting operation, however, begins only when
needed. In other words, before running the PUF, the random index is generated by
the TRNG. For example, in our implementation the response sequence has a length
of 1024 which results in a 10-bit index. To generate a 10-bit random index, we have
to run the TRNG 8×10 clock cycles according to Table 6.8. Since we do not care
about the response bits that are generated before and after the substring window, we
do not need to even generate or store those bits. Therefore, the PUF has to only be
challenged for the response bits in the substring. This significantly reduces the over-
all run time and the storage requirement on the FIFO. The FIFO size is accordingly
equal to the length of the substring which is set to 256 in our implementation.
The propagation delay through the PUF and the TRNG core is equal to 61.06ns.
PUF outputs can be generated at a maximum rate of 16Mbit/sec. Post-processing
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on the TRNG output bits can lower the throughput from 16Mbit/sec to 2Mbit/sec.
Since the TRNG is only used to generate the nonce and the index, its throughput
does not affect the overall system performance; the number of required true random
bits is smaller than the PUF response bits.
Table 6.8 : Implementation overhead on Virtex 5 FPGA
No. Type LUT Registers RAM ROM Clock
blocks blocks Cycles
4 PUF 128 1 0 0 1
1 TRNG 128 12 4KB 64KB 8
1 FIFO 0 256 0 0 N/A
2 LFSR 2 128 0 0 N/A
1 Control 12 9 0 0 N/A
Total 652 278 4KB 64KB N/A
FIFO
TRNG
PUF C
ontrol
Prover
Matching 
Algorithm
PUF
Model
Verifier
PRNG
TRNG
Figure 6.8 : Resource usage on prover and verifier sides
The implementation overhead of our proposed protocol is much less than tradi-
tional cryptographic modules. For example, robust hashing implementation of SHA-2
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as listed in Table 6.9 requires at least 5492 LUTs of a Virtex-II FPGA [3] and it takes
68 clock cycles to evaluate. This overhead will occur on the top of the clock cycles
required for PUF evaluation.
Finally, note that most of the area overhead for the protocol implementation is
coming from the TRNG. By using non-volatile memory storage, TRNG can also be
avoided. A Slender PUF implementation without a TRNG generates log2(L) extra
response bits and uses the extra bits as the index value. Also to generate the nonce,
previously used and revealed substring response bits can re-write the nonces and be
used for the next round of authentication. This is because for a statistically unbiased
PUF, the responses follow random number properties. In this case, the contents of
the non-volatile memory is publicly available and there will be no external access
point to change or re-write the values to the memory. However, this implementation
is vulnerable to invasive attacks that aim to alter the memory content.
Table 6.9 : SHA-2 implementation overhead as reported in [3]
SHA-256 Freq. Clock TP Area
(MHz) Cycles (Mbps) (LUTs)
Basic 133.06 68 1009 5492
2x-unrolled 73.97 28 996.7 8128
4x-unrolled 40.83 23 908.9 11592
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This doctoral thesis presented novel formal requirements, properties, and protocols for
PUFs that are used to design new architectures and implementations. The thesis lays
out the foundation to formally define and derive a set of requirements and properties
for physically unclonable functions. These requirements provide us with tools and
guidelines to analyze, test, and evaluate PUF architectures and the implications of
the choice of architecture on security and performance.
Once the requirements and desired properties are determined, robust and effi-
cient PUFs architectures were introduced and implemented across various platforms
including digital and analog ICs that conform to the introduced requirements. In par-
ticular, two PUF implementation were shown on FPGAs leveraging delay variation
of digital components. The first method uses an at-speed characterization mecha-
nism to measure component delays. The second is the long-sought implementation of
arbiter-based PUF. Many efforts made by the research community to implement the
arbiter-based PUF on FPGA had been previously unsuccessful. The main reason for
such difficulty was the inability to achieve a symmetric routing of the arbiter PUF.
The difficulty arises from the lack of freedom in routing on FPGA dictated by the
rigid fabric of FPGA interconnects. In this thesis, I showed the first implementation
of arbiter-based PUF on FPGA realized through a novel delay tuning mechanism of
pico-second resolution. An ultra-low power analog implementation on ASIC was pre-
sented that exploits variations in sub-threshold leakage currents of MOS devices. This
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is the most power efficient and smallest PUF known to date. The circuit was taped
out in IBM 90nm low power technology. The results show that the leakage-based PUF
circuit consumes 40 femto-joules to generate one bit of response. Full performance
analysis and comparison were carried out on these implementations. Statistical prop-
erties and performance metrics such as response error rate in presence temperature
and voltage supply variations as well as speed, area, and power consumption were
measured and reported.
Finally, design of low overhead and secure protocols using PUFs was presented.
The goal of these protocols is to protect the PUF against machine learning attacks
and prevent eavesdroppers or dishonest provers to pass the authentication without
having access to the physical medium (PUF). Also, the protocols prevent an attacker
disguised as a verifier to extract information from the PUF. The protocols are designed
with elegant simplicity in mind specifically to lower overhead and to refrain from
using computationally expensive classic cryptographic modules and error correction
techniques. Two specific protocols, one exploiting a time bound on the authentication
process and the other one utilizing a pattern matching index-based authentication on
PUF responses were introduced to integrate the PUF in lightweight applications. The
pattern matching protocol use a true random number (TRNG) to generate the nonces
and the random secret index. A TRNG based on flip flop metastability and a closed
loop feedback system is further developed and implemented on FPGA.
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Appendix A
TRNG
A.1 TRNG System Design
To drive the flip-flop into its metastable state, we use an at-speed monitor-and-control
mechanism that establishes a closed loop feedback system. The monitor module keeps
track of the output bit probabilities over repeated time intervals. It then passes on the
information to the control unit. The control unit based on the received probability
information decides to add/subtract the delay to/from top/bottom paths to calibrate
the delay difference so that it gets closer to zero. For instance, if the output bits are
highly skewed towards 1, then the delay difference (∆) must be decreased by increas-
ing the top path delay to balance the probabilities. Figure A.1 (a) demonstrates this
concept.
Control
MonitorD
C
Q
PDL
Binary Sequence
(a)
³
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ǻf
IntegralArbiter
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(b)
Figure A.1 : The TRNG system model.
A straightforward implementation of the monitoring unit can be realized by using
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a counter. The counter value is incremented every time the flip-flop outputs ‘1’ and
is decremented whenever the flip-flop generates a ‘0’. This is analogous to performing
a running sum over the sequence of output bits where zeros are replaced by ‘−1’. If
zeros and ones are equally likely, the value of the counter will stay almost constant. A
feedback signal is generated proportional to any deviation from this constant steady
state value. The generated error signal is fed back to the signal-to-delay transducer,
i.e., the PDL. The delay difference (∆) is updated/corrected based on the feedback
signal.
The described system is in effect a proportional-integral (PI) controller. The
system is depicted in Figure A.1 (b). In this figure, ∆b is the constant bias/skew
in delays caused by the routing asymmetries. ∆p is the delay difference induced
by changes in environmental and operational conditions such as temperature and
supply voltage, and/or delay difference imposed by active adversarial attacks. ∆f is
the correction feedback delay difference injected by the PDL based on the counter
value. Equation A.1 expresses the total delay difference at the input of the flip-flop.
G represents transformation carried out by the PDL from the counter binary value
to an analog delay difference. The arbiter and integrator refer to the flip-flop and
counter respectively. Therefore, the following relationship holds;
∆ = ∆p +∆b −∆f . (A.1)
An example PDL-based implementation of the TRNG system is shown in Figure A.2.
The PDLs are depicted as gray triangles which provide the finest and most granular
level of control over the delays. If the resulting delay difference from one PDL is equal
to δ, the effective input/output delay of a PDL, D(i), for the binary input i would
be:
D(i) = i× dc + (1− i)× (dc + δ). (A.2)
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Figure A.2 : The TRNG system implementation with a PI controller on FPGA.
where dc is a constant delay value. Each programmable delay block consists of two
PDLs. The control input of top PDL inside each block is the complement of the bot-
tom PDL control input in order to make a differential programmable delay structure.
Based on Equation A.3, the differential delay is:
Ddiff (i) = (1− 2i)× δ = (−1)iδ, i = 0 or 1. (A.3)
In this example, the programmable delay blocks are packed in groups with sizes of
multiples of two to efficiently generate any desirable delay difference using a binary
control input. In other words, the first programmable delay block consists of two
PDLs, the second one contains 4 PDLs, and so on. With this arrangement, the total
incurred delay difference can be written as:
∆f = G(C) =
K∑
i=0
(−1)Ci2iδ, (A.4)
where Ci ∈ C is the ith counter bit with i = 0 being the least significant bit
(LSB) and i = K being the most significant bit (MSB), and C represents the
counter value. δ is the smallest possible delay difference produced by one PDL.
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Counter I t Ib w
111 1111 0000 +4
110 0111 0000 +3
101 0011 0000 +2
100 0001 0000 +1
000 0000 0001 −1
001 0000 0011 −2
010 0000 0111 −3
011 0000 1111 −4
Figure A.3 : Decoding
operation.
Let us assume that in the beginning the counter is re-
set to zero. The resulting feedback delay difference is
∆f = (2(K+1) − 1) × δ according to Equation A.4. This
large delay difference skews the output of flip-flop toward
‘1’. This keeps raising the counter value, lowering the de-
lay difference (∆). As ∆ approaches zero, the flip-flop be-
gins to output ‘0’s more frequently and lowers the rate at
which the counter value was previously increasing. At the
steady state, the counter value will settle around a con-
stant value with a slight oscillatory behavior. Any outside
perturbation on delays will cause transient fluctuations in
bit probabilities; however, the automatic adjustment mechanism brings the system
back to the equilibrium state.
Although the performance of the system in Figure A.2 seems ideally flawless, a
straightforward hardware implementation was not successful. This is because the
design is based on the assumption that δs from PDLs are equal. However, due to
manufacturing process variability, the δs slightly vary from one PDL to another. As
a result, it is not feasible to generate any desirable delay difference, because the
intended weights are not exactly multiples of two anymore. In particular, the input
to the largest programmable delay block dominates the system’s output behavior.
Instead, we took an alternative approach and used two sets of fine and coarse
delay tuning blocks as shown in Figure A.4. With n fine tuning delay lines with a
resolution of δfn, and m coarse tuning delay line with resolution of δcs, any delay
difference in the range of R = [nδfn+mδcs,−nδfn−mδcs] that satisfies Equation A.5
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can be produced.
∆f = wfnδfn + wcsδcs (A.5)
where wfn and wcs are integer weights (or levels) such that −n < wfn < n and
−m < wcs < m. By carefully selecting n,m, δfn, and δcs, any delay difference with a
resolution of δfn can be produced within the range R.
The system in Figure A.4 is designed such that the weights (or tuning levels) in
Equation A.5 are a function of the difference in the total number of ‘1’s at PDL inputs
on the top and bottom paths;
wfn =
n∑
i=1
I t[i]−
n∑
i=1
Ib[i], wcs =
m∑
i=1
I t[i]−
m∑
i=1
Ib[i] (A.6)
where I t[i] ∈ {0, 1} and Ib[i] ∈ {0, 1} are the input signals to PDLs as demonstrated
in Figure A.4. Thus, decoder block in Figure A.4 needs to perform a mapping from
the counter value to the number of ‘1’s at PDL inputs. For example, if n = 4, the
counter value of ‘111’ corresponds to -4 and ‘000’ corresponds to +4. Table A.3
shows an example of decoding operation and corresponding tuning weights for a 3-
bit counter. The conversion from the counter value to the effective tuning weight is
expressed by Equation A.7.
wfn = (−1)CK ×
(
1 +
K−1∑
i=0
Ci2
i
)
, K = -log2n.. (A.7)
The fundamentals of the system’s operation shown in Figure A.4 are the same as
the system in Figure A.2 with the only difference lying in how the feedback signal is
generated based on the counter states.
Notice that the controller type determines the response time to changes in delays
as well as the error in the steady state response. Proportional integral (PI) controllers
as opposed to proportional integral derivative (PID) controller due to the lack of
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Figure A.4 : The complete TRNG system.
derivative function can make the system more stable in the steady state in the case
of noisy data. This is because derivative action is more sensitive to higher-frequency
terms in the inputs. Additionally, a PI-controlled system is less responsive to inputs
(including noise) and so the system will be slower to respond to quick perturbations
on the delays than a well-tuned PID system.
The following two observations are important from a security standpoint. First, in
the steady state, the counter value oscillates around a constant center value (Ccenter).
Let us define the oscillation amplitude as the peak-to-peak range of the oscillations,
i.e. the maximum counter value minus the minimum counter value (Cmax − Cmin).
The oscillation is not as periodic as one might think. It is rather a random walk
around the center value. Each step in the random walk involves going from one
counter value to a one lower or higher value:
Step : Ccurrent → Ccurrent ± 1
The probability of each step (move) is a function of the current location. Intuitively
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the probability of going outside the range is almost zero:
Prob{Cmax → Cmax + 1} * 0
Prob{Cmin → Cmin − 1} * 0 (A.8)
Also assuming a smooth monotonically increasing probability curve as shown in
Figure A.5 for the flip-flop, the farther the current counter value is from the center
(Ccenter), the lower the probability of moving farther away from the center:
Prob{Ci → Ci + 1} < Prob{Cj → Cj + 1} for Cj < Ci
Prob{Ci → Ci − 1} < Prob{Cj → Cj − 1} for Cj < Ci (A.9)
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Figure A.5 : (a) Flip-flop operation under four sampling scenarios, (b) probability of
output being equal to ‘1’ as a function of the input signals delay difference (∆). The
numbers on the probability plot correspond to each signal arrival scenario.
Each generated output bit corresponds to a counter value. The probability of the
output being to ‘1’ is a function of the feedback counter value. The maximum counter
value almost always results in a ‘0’ output, since a ‘0’ value decrements the counter
value. Based on Equation A.8, transition Cmax → Cmax + 1 is unlikely, thus r(Cmax)
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can almost never be ‘1’. The following deductions can be explained similarly:
Prob{r(Ccenter) = 1} * 0.5
Prob{r(Cmin) = 1} * 1
Prob{r(Cmax) = 1} * 0 (A.10)
In other words, during the random walk only those steps that pass close at the
center point will result in high entropy and non-deterministic responses. A smaller
error in the steady state response means oscillations happen closer to center of the
probability transition curve which in turn leads to higher randomness in generated
output bits.
In addition, it is desired that the system responds as quickly as possible to external
perturbations since the during the recovery time the TRNG generates output bits with
highly skewed probabilities.
A.2 Experimental results
In this section, we present the LUT-based PDL delay measurement evaluations and
TRNG hardware implementation results obtained from Xilinx Virtex 5 LX50T FPGA.
Before moving onto the TRNG system performance evaluation, we shall first dis-
cuss the results of our investigation on the maximum achievable resolution of the
PDLs. We set up a highly accurate delay measurement system similar to the delay
characterization systems presented in Section 4.1 of Chapter 4.
The circuit under test consists of four PDLs each implemented by a single 6-input
LUT. The delay measurement circuit as shown in Figure A.6 consists of three flip-
flops: launch, sample, and capture flip-flops. At each rising edge of the clock, the
launch flip-flop successively sends a low-to-high and high-to-low signal through the
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PDLs. At the falling edge of the clock, the output from the last PDL is sampled by
the sample flip-flop. At the last PDL’s output, the sampled signal is compared with
the steady state signal. If the signal has already arrived at the sample flip-flop when
the sampling takes place, then these two values will be the same; Otherwise they
take on different values. In case of inconsistency in sampled and actual values, XOR
output becomes high, which indicates a timing error. The capture flip-flop holds the
XOR output for one clock cycle.
To measure the absolute delays, the clock frequency is swept from a low frequency
to a high target frequency and the rate at which timing errors occur are monitored and
recorded. Timing errors start to emerge when the clock half period (T/2) approaches
the delay of the circuit under test. Around this point, the timing error rate begins
to increase from 0% and reaches 100%. The center of this transition curve marks the
point where the clock half period (T/2) is equal to the effective delay of the circuit
under test.
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Figure A.6 : The delay measurement circuit. The circuit under test consists of four
LUTs each implementing a PDL.
To measure the delay difference incurred by the LUT-based PDL, the measurement
is performed twice using different inputs. In the first round of measurement, the
inputs to the four PDLs are fixed to A2−6 = 11111. In the second measurement the
inputs to the last PDL are changed to A2−6 = 00000. In our setup, a 32×32 array of
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the circuit shown on Figure A.6 is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex 5 LX110 FPGA,
and the delay from our setup is measured under the two input settings. The clock
frequency is swept linearly from 8MHz to 20MHz using a desktop function generator
and this frequency is shifted up by 34 times inside the FPGA using the built-in PLL.
To evaluate the performance of the TRNG system, we implement the system
shown in Figure A.4 using 32 coarse and fine programmable delay lines (n = m = 32).
A 12-bit counter performs the running sum operation on the output generated bits.
The first six (LSB) bits control the finely tunable PDLs, and the next six (MSB) bits
control the coarsely tunable PDLs. Both fine and coarse PDLs are implemented by
using one LUT as shown in Figure A.7. As illustrated in Figure A.7, to implement
the fine PDL, the LUT inputs A3 to A6 are fixed to zero and the only input that
controls the delay is A2. For the coarse PDL, all of the LUT inputs are tied and
controlled together.
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Figure A.7 : Coarse and fine PDLs implemented by a single 6-input LUT.
In the first experiment, we only examine the forward system, which consists of the
PDLs, the flip-flop, and the decoders. The tuning weights/levels are swept from the
minimum to maximum, and the probability of the flip-flop producing a ‘1’ output is
measured at each level. This probability is measured by repeating each experiment
over 100 times and counting the number of times the flip-flop outputs a ‘1’. Since
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n = m = 32, both the fine and coarse tuning levels can go from −32 to 32. Recall
that the tuning level represents the difference in the total number of ones at PDL
inputs on the top path minus those on the bottom path (see Equation A.6). As
can be observed from Figure A.8, increasing both the coarse and fine tuning levels
increase the probability of output being equal to ‘1’. The non-smoothness of the
probability curve is due to variability in the manufacturing process which creates
local non-monotonicity. With these observations, we expect the feedback system
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Figure A.8 : The probability of flip-flip generating a ‘1’ output as a function of the
fine and coarse tuning levels.
behavior to stabilize somewhere close to the center of the transition point. Next, we
close the feedback loop and initialize the operation. At the beginning, the counter is
loaded with all ‘1’s (which results in a decimal value of 212-1 = 4095). Figure A.9
shows the counter value as the operation progresses. The x-axis is the number of clock
cycles. Once the operation starts, the counter value keeps decreasing until it reaches
the value of approximately 700 after about 3,400 clock cycles. From this point further,
the counter value reaches a steady state with a slight oscillatory behavior around a
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Figure A.9 : The transient counter value (decimal) versus the clock cycles.
constant value. A close-up of the steady state behavior is depicted in the lower plot
of Figure A.9. The close-up zooms into the segment between 25,000 to 30,000 clock
cycles. As can be observed in the steady state, the counter value oscillates between
559 and 564.
Next, we investigate the frequencies at which counter values appear in the steady
state. In this experiment, we collect 1,000,000 counter values in the steady state
and plot the histogram of the observed values as shown in the middle plot (b) in
Figure A.10. The normalized histogram suggests that the counter holds the value of
561 more than 40% of the time. Next, it is critical to investigate the probabilities
associated with each courter value. In other words, we would like to know for the
given counter values − which produce a feedback input to the TRNG core − the
probability of the flip-flop output being equal to ‘1’. The top plot (a) in Figure A.10
presents this result. It is interesting to see that most of the counter values produce
highly skewed probabilities. Among these counter values, 561 leads to a ‘1’ output
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Figure A.10 : Distribution of the steady state counter values and associated bit
probabilities.
slightly more than 40% of the time. We define a metric which is the multiplication
of the counter values’ frequency of occurrence with the probability of output being
equal to one for each counter value. This metric represents the contribution of each
counter value to the total number of ‘1’ in the output sequence. The metric values
are shown in bottom plot (c) in Figure A.10.
To remove the bias in the output sequence in a systematic way as well as to
eliminate predictable patterns, we propose a filtering mechanism based on the steady
state counter values. The filter unit analyzes the output bit probabilities for each
counter value within a window of specific size and flags the counter values that lead to
outputs bits with skewed probabilities. Next, it filters out the output bits associated
with the flagged counter values. For example, in our implementation, the filter only
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allows output bits associated with the counter value of 561 to pass through. As a
result, the bit-rate is lowered to almost half of the original bit-rate. However, the
output bits may still suffer from bias in the bit probabilities. Therefore, a post-
processing unit after the filter unit is used to remove any localized biases from the
bitstream. In our implementation, we use a von Neumann corrector to perform the
post-processing task. The results of the NIST randomness test from running on
megabytes of data is shown in Table A.1. The comprehensive test results are available
online at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/ mm7/trng/.
Table A.1 includes the results of the NIST statistical test suite on megabytes of
collected data after counter-based filtering and von Neumann correction are performed
on the TRNG output bitstream. Due to the large bias in the probabilities, most of the
randomness failed when the test was run on the output bitstream before the filtering
and correction were carried out.
Finally, according to the ISE Synthesis report, the propagation delay through the
TRNG core is equal to 61.06ns which achieves a bit-rate of 16Mbit/sec. The bit-rate
drops to 1/8 of the original bit-rate (to 2Mbit/sec) after filtering and von Neumann
correction. The TRNG core consumes 128 LUTs that are packed into 16 Virtex 5
CLBs. Note that in practice multiple TRNG cores can run in parallel to offer a higher
bit-rate.
133
Table A.1 : NIST Statistical Test Suite results.
Statistical Test Block/Template length Lowest success ratio
Frequency - 100%
Frequency within blocks 128 100%
Cumulative sums - 100%
Runs - 100%
Longest run within blocks - 100%
Binary rank - 100%
FFT - 100%
Non-overlapping templates 9 90%
Overlapping templates 9 100%
Maurer’s universal test 7 100%
Approximate entropy 10 100%
Random excursions - 100%
Serial 16 100%
Linear complexity 500 90%
134
Appendix B
Plots
In this appendix, a comprehensive list of measurement results and plots for each
FPGA is shown. The Figures B.1 through B.12 show the transition in the number of
’1’s in responses as the tuning level is swept from 40 to -10. At each fixed tuning level,
64,000 challenges are fed to the PUF and 64,000 responses are collected. The best
tuning level is the one for which the PUF responses are half zeros and half ones. Each
line ine the following figures corresponds to each of the PUF output bits. Since each
PUF on each FPGA produces 16 response bits, there are 16 lines on each subplot.
There are 9 subplots in each plot. Each subplot corresponds to the measurement
taken under a different operating condition. The center subplot refers to the normal
supply voltage and room temperature.
The Figures B.13 to B.24 show the robustness of the responses to different subset
of challenges. Each challenge to the arbiter PUF creates a delay difference (∆) at the
input of the arbiter (flip-flop). The ∆s produced by all challenges in the challenge
space form a Gaussian distribution. If half of the responses are one and half are
zero, then this distribution has a mean of zero. The distribution is split by the
arbiter decision border (line). Those challenges that create a ∆ that is larger that
e, result in a ’1’ response and a zero response otherwise. e is basically the arbiter
bias remained after tuning. We partition the ∆ distribution and the corresponding
challenge space into 20 sets of equal size. The ∆s close to the decision border are
more sensitive to environmental condition fluctuations, and those farther apart from
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the decision border (i.e. —∆ - e — & 0) are less affected by such fluctuations.
The following figures quantify these effects for each of the twenty challenge sub-sets.
The x-axis in each subplot refers to the challenge partition (bin) number. Each
partition contains 64000/20 = 3200 challenges. The y-axis shows the stability of the
corresponding responses, where ’1’ means no errors in the responses and ’0’ means
completely erroneous responses. The error is measured by comparing the responses
from eight corner cases to the response at the normal operating condition (room
temperature and nominal supply voltage). Therefore, each subplot contains eight
lines for each corner case. As it can be observed the challenges in bins that are closer
to the decision border produce responses with larger error rates. There are 16 subplot
in each figure where each correspond to a PUF output response bit.
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Figure B.1 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 6.
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Figure B.2 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 7.
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Figure B.3 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 8.
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Figure B.4 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 9.
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Figure B.5 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 10.
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Figure B.6 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 11.
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Figure B.7 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 12.
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Figure B.8 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 13.
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Figure B.9 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 14.
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Figure B.10 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 15.
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Figure B.11 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 16.
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Figure B.12 : Number of ’1’s in responses (normalized) as a function of tuning level
for the PUF on FPGA 17.
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Figure B.13 : Response stability measured across different challenge partitions with
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Figure B.14 : Response stability measured across different challenge partitions with
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Figure B.15 : Response stability measured across different challenge partitions with
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Figure B.17 : Response stability measured across different challenge partitions with
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Figure B.24 : Response stability measured across different challenge partitions with
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